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Belize, formally British Honduras, is a small country
about the size of the state of Massachusetts located on the
Caribbean Sea between Mexico and Guatemala. By its geo-
graphic location it is very much a part of Central America,
yet its culture, history, government and language are all
much more closely linked with the island Caribbean coun-
tries. Consequently, it has often been excluded in group-
ings of Central American countries and ranked as a Caribbean
country.
Belize was carved out of the Central American mainland
by British pirates and loggers. The name "Belize" is in
fact believed to be a derivation of the name of a Scotsman,
Peter Wallace, who settled in the seventeenth century on the
Bay of Honduras in the current area of Belize City.
Through the years, Belize developed a very British identity
and by the early 1800s Britain began to recognize the Bay of
Honduras settlement as a colony. Aldous Huxley once visited
the colony of British Honduras and in his book, Beyond the
Mexique Bay , he stated: "If the world had any ends, British
Honduras would surely be one of them." Huxley had visited
Belize a short time after a hurricane had left much of
Belize City in ruins. This sight along with Belize's ever

present mosquitoes and uniformly hot and humid climate un-
doubtedly led to Huxley's analysis. Admittedly, Belize is
an obscure little country that has seldom occupied the
forefront of world attention. Consequently, few people
outside of Central American and Caribbean scholars or inha-
bitants are even likely to know where Belize is located.
Despite Belize's obscurity, it was able to gain the atten-
tion of the international community during the 1960s and
1970s and to marshall its overwhelming support for Belize's
independence struggle.
In 1950, a nationalist movement arose within Belize in
the guise of the People's United Party (PUP). This party
was led by a man who is recognized today as the Father of
Belize, George Price. Mr. Price and his PUP assumed the
leadership of the Belizean government in the 1950s and
maintained it up until the most recent Belizean elections in
December 1984. During the PUP's tenure, it set out to turn
the British colony of British Honduras into the independent
nation of Belize. The fight against colonialism and for
independence was in fact the PUP's paramount objective.
Britain was not altogether unwilling to allow independence,
but Guatemala retained an unresolved territorial claim to
Belizean territory that dated back to the days of Spanish
colonialism in the fifteenth century. In retaining its
claim, Guatemala had also made periodic military threats to
recoup the Belizean territory, and as a result Britain was
unwilling to release a colony that was likely to be invaded
upon a British withdrawal. On the other hand, Britain was

also initially unwilling to grant Belize an independence
that would require a continuing umbrella of British protec-
tion. Despite its initial unwillingness, Britain did grant
Belize its independence with a defense guarantee on
21 September 1981. British troops that protected the colony
of Belize remained to protect the independent nation of
Belize. Britain finally granted a threatened Belize its
independence with a reluctant defense guarantee because of
the influence of the international community.
Belize under the leadership of George Price and his
PUP began a concerted diplomatic initiative in the early
1960s to win international support for Belize's rights of
self-determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity
—
in short its right to independence. Belize faced a very
difficult task because virtually all of its neighbors, in-
cluding the United States leaned towards supporting the
Guatemalan position in the age-old Anglo-Guatemalan dispute.
Despite this and with very limited diplomatic resources,
Belize began a diplomatic appeal using the platforms of
international organizations in order to present its case.
Belize achieved remarkable success. Although the dispute
with Guatemala remains unresolved, an ostracized Guatemala
stands virtually alone today in its anachronistic territo-
rial claim while an independent Belize is reaping the bene-
fits of the stature, prestige and relationships which it
acquired through its active participation in international
forums. This paper will provide a brief historical trace of
Belize's colonial beginnings and the development of its

independence movement, but it will focus primarily on the
PUP Government's effective use of international organiza-
tions to achieve its objective of independence. In review-
ing Belize's diplomatic initiative it becomes obvious that






Guatemala's claim to the territory of Belize dates
back to the days of Spanish colonialism in the fifteenth
century. Spanish conquistadors had laid claim to much of
the New World, so much so that in 1493, Pope Alexander VI,
by his perceived divine right of Papal donation, gave
Ferdinand and Isabella of Spain all of what is recognized
today as Central America and much of North and South
America. A year later, Spain signed a treaty with Portugal
to recognize Portugese territories in the New World and to
confirm the Papal donation to Spain. Spanish conquistadors
continued to explore their "God given" territory and by
1527, a governor had been appointed to administer the area
of the Yucatan peninsula, which included the current land
area of Belize. The governor apparently determined that the
area of today's Belize was unsuitable for habitation because
no Spanish settlements were ever created there.
Eventually, the Spanish Central American territories
were subdivided by the Vice-Royalty of New Spain into pro-
vinces. Guatemala was one of these provinces and it origi-
nally included much of today's Belize. Guatemala City at

one time was the seat of the colonial government that con-
trolled five provinces. These five provinces, which also
became known as the Kingdom of Guatemala included Guatemala,
Honduras, Costa Rica, El Salvador and Nicaragua.
As the winds of independence began to stir among the
Spanish colonies in the early nineteenth century, they did
not escape Central America. In September 1821, the old
Spanish provinces declared themselves independent and united
as a Central American Federation of States. An 1823 declar-
ation stated that the federation was comprised of all of the
states formerly constituting the Kingdom of Guatemala and
that the new states were to take the boundaries of the
original Spanish provinces.
This Federation of States or Central American Republic
as it became known, was a very short lived union. Each of
the individual states declared their own independence sepa-
rately from Spain. Guatemala did so in 1823 and at the time
it clearly defined its borders as those of the original
Spanish province. It did this, even though the area of
Belize had never been settled by either Spaniards or
Guatemalans and in spite of the presence of a British
settlement. Guatemala's claim to the territory rested in
what it saw as its legitimate rights of inheritance as a
successor state to Spain.
The British presence in what Guatemala saw as its
sovereign territory posed a real problem for Guatemala,
especially when Britain began moves toward colonization of
its settlement in the Bay of Honduras area within a year

after Guatemala's independence. A number of agreements and
treaties between Spain and Great Britain had served to
legitimize a British presence in the area for the purpose of
extracting lumber. However, a number of other agreements
and treaties prior to Guatemalan independence seemed to
indicate that Britain had no early intent to create an
expansion of its empire in Central America. It has in fact
been argued that it was only after Guatemala declared
independence that the British subjects within the territory
became concerned about Guatemala's claims to their lands and
sought British sovereignty.
After the colonists' request Britain did slowly begin
to establish its sovereignty but, in the meantime,
Guatemala's and Great Britain's diplomatic relations
remained cordial enough to meet for negotiations to resolve
their territorial dispute. In 1859, they did conclude a
treaty. Unfortunately, an article of this treaty was never
fully implemented and the two countries disagree to this day
as to its other provisions. Britain believes it concluded a
boundary agreement that firmly established Belize.
Guatemala believes that it ceded territory to Britain for
certain concessions that were never received. The arguments
of both sides concerning this treaty are crucial to an
understanding of the present territorial dispute. A closer
look at the 1859 treaty will follow a brief look at the
historical British territorial claims.

British Claims
Early in the seventeenth century, it was believed that
English settlers first appeared on the Central American
coast near the Bay of Honduras. They were a combination of
loggers and buccaneers. The buccaneers probably arrived
first because they found the coastal islands and hidden
coves and bays a convenient place to hide before and after
pirating Spanish galleons returning to Spain with their New
World riches. The first British settlement is usually
attributed to the year 1638 in the area of modern Belize
o
City. A number of treaties and diplomatic agreements
between Britain and Spain regarding their Central American
territories took place during the following one hundred and
fifty years. In 1783, as part of the settlement of the
Versailles Treaty, Spain did grant territorial logging
q
rights to Britain in the Bay of Honduras area. This
territory was later expanded in another agreement three
years later. u
Britain's interest in the area was probably only for
its riches of logwood and mahogany, rather than any real
desire to develop an expansion of the British Empire. ^ In
fact, legislation of the British Parliament in 1817 and 1819
relating to British territories did not include the area of
Belize. 2
It was argued that it was not until the nineteenth
century gave birth to the independence movement in Latin
America that there was a "change in the attitude of the
British Foreign Office towards the British settlement in
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the Bay of Honduras." Largely through internal requests
from British subjects in the territory did the British
government even try to negotiate a settlement to firmly
establish British sovereignty over the area. This plea
from the settlement stemmed from Guatemala's claim that the
entire area of Central America was a part of the new Central
American States. The boundaries of these new states were to
be those of the provinces created by the Vice-Royalty of New
Spain back in the days of the early Spanish colonialism
following the Pope's gift. England and other European
countries, however, had never acknowledged the Pope's
donation as legitimate. Queen Elizabeth I was remembered
referring to the gift as "imaginary propriety." She
further indicated that it would not "hinder other princes
from trading in those countries, or from transporting
colonies into those parts thereof where the Spaniards do not
inhabit." Consequently, in the 1820s when the nation of
Guatemala was first created and determined its borders to
include the British territory, the British thought it
absurd. Since neither Spanish nor Guatemalan settlers had
ever settled in the Belizean territory, British settlers
believed their claims to the area more legitimate, and the
British government slowly began to back them up by
establishing legal sovereignty over the territory.
In 1825, the British government acknowledged and
established the sovereign rights of the settlers in the Bay
of Honduras. In 1840, British laws were made applicable to




was born. ° Originally, British Honduras was established as
a part of Jamaica. In 1871, it was afforded Crown Colony
status with its own lieutenant governor, but, he was
subservient to Jamaica's governor. In 1884, British
Honduras achieved full Crown Colony status with its own
19governor.
Anglo-Guatemalan Treaty of 1859
Around the same time that Guatemalan independence
occurred and British governmental interest picked up, the
United States was also getting involved. In 1823, the
United States espoused the Monroe Doctrine which claimed all
of the hemisphere as an area of U. S. interest. It also
forbade all European expansion in the hemisphere. The isth-
mus canal was also under construction in nearby Panama and
20the United States did not want any European encroachment.
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 19 April 1850, between
the United States and Britain, was a treaty where both
countries reneged their rights towards involvement in Latin
2 1American states. It was largely negotiated to acknowledge
the Monroe Doctrine. Britain however, did not interpret the
treaty to require its withdrawal of the Belizean territory,
22but rather a prohibition of any further expansion. Many
United States congressmen, however, upon passing the treaty,
interpreted it otherwise and were outraged at the contin-
uance of British occupation of Guatemala, but, more impor-
tantly, they claimed, "any assertion of British sovereignty
2 3
over Belize as an infringement of the Monroe Doctrine. J
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The debate went on until six years later when a new
treaty, the Dallas-Clarendon Treaty, between the United
States and Britain resolved that the earlier Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty did not apply to the Bay of Honduras settlement, but,
that within two years of the Dallas-Clarendon Treaty,
Britain must come to some agreement with Guatemala. Con-
certed efforts were made towards meeting this treaty re-
quirement and it did result in the negotiations between
Guatemala and Britain that led to the Anglo-Guatemalan
Treaty of 1859.
This treaty was a relatively short treaty of only
eight articles. Most of it dealt with defining territorial
borders and establishing relations between the two areas.
One of the articles, however, proved to be quite controver-
sial, from shortly after the treaty was negotiated through
today. Article seven indicated that both countries would:
. . . mutually agree conjointly to use their best
efforts by taking adequate means for establishing the
easiest communication (either by means of a cart-road,
or employing the rivers, or both united according
to the opinion of the surveying engineers), between
the fittest place on the Atlantic coast near the
settlement of Belize and the capital of Guatemala.
Britain conducted numerous land surveys in preparation for
complying with the requirements of article seven but upon
their completion it determined that the cost estimates made
the building of such a road prohibitive.
A convention was held in 1863 to reach agreement as to
how article seven could be resolved. Britain offered sev-
eral proposals, such as sharing the building cost of the
road and simply paying Guatemala fifty thousand pounds.

12
Shortly after the convention met, Guatemala became involved
in a border war with El Salvador and it never officially
o ft
acted on the British proposals. By 1867, Britain announced
that it felt the matter was resolved; that by Guatemala's
failure to act or respond to the convention proposals,
? 9Britain was not obligated to fulfill article seven.
Guatemala in turn retorted that the entire treaty was thus
null and void. Britain did not see it that way. It felt
that the treaty was a boundary agreement that established
definite boundaries between two sovereign territories, and,
that article seven was simply a mutual agreement in addition
-j
ito that. Guatemala, on the other hand, believed that the
building of the road was compensatory for its cession of
territory to Britain, and since the road was never built,
the territory remained Guatemalan land.
The language of the 1859 treaty definitely seemed to
favor British interpretation. J The treaty begins: "Whereas
the boundary . . . has not yet been ascertained and marked
out." Guatemala cannot deny this but its view has been
that the treaty was written and described as a boundary
agreement only in order to not seem to infringe the provi-
sions of the 1850 Clayton-Bulwer Treaty which specifically
prohibited further acquisition or control of territory in
"3 5Central America by either the United States or Britain.
Regardless, the Guatemalan and British interpretations of




Post Treaty of 1859 Relations
On 28 December 1920, Britain proposed to Guatemala
that they begin land surveys to establish boundary demarca-
tions. Guatemala was slow in responding but on 3 January
1929, it gave its consent. In the meantime, a 1928 Treaty
of Commerce and Navigation was signed between Guatemala and
Great Britain concerning Guatemalan-British Honduran rela-
tions. During these treaty negotiations there was never any
mention of the 1859 Treaty or the infamous article seven.
Britain began its survey work in May 1829 and by
August 1831 notes had been exchanged which indicated agree-
ment on the boundary demarcations that had been completed
thus far. In June 1832, Britain began additional survey
work and by February 1933, they were prepared to have
Guatemala confirm their results. On 4 March 1933, Guatemala
reintroduced the question of article seven of the 1859
treaty. It did however send its own engineers "to corrobo-
rate with the British engineers in the survey for boundary
demarcation." Although no official agreement of these
boundary demarcations was reached, Guatemala continued to
participate until the operations were completed on 20 June
1934. 38
It has been argued by some that Guatemala's renewed
claim to Belize in 1933 was prompted by the prospect of oil
discoveries. Several major oil companies were interested
in explorations in the area, and they have in fact since
drilled exploratory wells, but, nothing of fruition has ever
come of their search.
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British feelings seemed to view Guatemala's close
cooperation during the boundary surveys of the early 1930s
as de facto recognition of the earlier 1859 treaty.
Guatemalan feelings, however, seemed to indicate that the
boundary demarcation cooperation was conducted without
Guatemala formally agreeing to anything. Their participa-
tion had always been conditional upon "the compensatory
stipulations of article seven of the 1859 treaty." 4 ^
The renewed Guatemalan claim in 1933 began a decade of
intense efforts towards resolving the Anglo-Guatemalan dis-
pute. In late 1936, Guatemala offered Britain specific
proposals which included returning land to Guatemala. They
were vehemently rejected by Britain. In 1937, Guatemala
proposed that the United States arbitrate the dispute.
Britain refused to allow this and the United States was not
interested anyway. In 1938, after many years of research,
the Guatemalan Ministry for Foreign Affairs published five
thousand Spanish and one thousand English copies of what
became known as the White Book . It was a scholarly and
lengthy volume that was distributed internationally to ex-
pound the historical and legal Guatemalan claims to Belize.
It clearly gained Guatemala much support, especially from
its Latin American neighbors. Through 1943, various addi-
tions were added to the original White Book which included
additional research and opinions from numerous Latin
American countries supporting Guatemala's claims.
During the years of World War II, Guatemala rested its
direct efforts with Britain to resolve the dispute, but the
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White Book campaign was quietly building international sup-
port for Guatemala's position. Shortly before the end of
World War II, on 11 March 1945, a new Guatemalan constitu-
tion was written which included Belize as part of Guatemala.
It further stated that "steps taken to obtain its recovery
were matters of national interest."
Anglo-Guatemalan diplomatic efforts were finally re-
sumed in 1946 and Britain agreed to allow the territorial
question to be resolved by a third party—the new
International Court of Justice at The Hague. Guatemala
originally consented, but the two parties could not agree as
to what the court would specifically be asked to decide so
nothing was done.
In 1948, rumors spread that Britain was planning to
resettle war refugee families in British Honduras.
Guatemala's resultant opposition and hostility led it to
close its border and to make preparations for a military
invasion of the Belizean territory. In response to this,
Britain sent two Navy cruisers and an infantry division to
defend the territory. Shortly thereafter, Guatemala asked
once again for United States' arbitration to resolve the
dispute, but both the United States and Britain were still
uninterested. Three years later on 21 May 1951, in a very
unexpected move, Guatemala suddenly reopened its border with
Belize. An official Guatemalan government announcement
attributed this action to the "magnificent relations between
the two countries."
During the 1950s, Guatemalan active interest in re-
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claiming Belize seemed to be minimal, however this seems to
be explained more by the internal unrest and turmoil in
Guatemala than by any real decline in Guatemalan interest in
recovering Belize.
Negotiations finally began again in 1962 in Puerto
Rico. They were bilateral talks between the United Kingdom
and Guatemala but Belizean Premier George Price was also
present as an observer. These were the first negotiations
that included a representative of Belize and Mr. Price took
advantage of the opportunity to let it be known that Belize
rejected any ideas that would lead to its association with
Guatemala. The talks were not productive and within a year
Guatemala severed its diplomatic relations with Britain due
to what it saw as a British willingness to grant indepen-
dence and sovereignty to Belize.
In 1965, talks began once again, in Miami, Florida.
They continued into 1966 but without any resolution of the
dispute. During these talks, however, the British and
Guatemalan negotiators agreed to request outside mediation
from the United States. This arbitration attempt failed to
provide an agreeable settlement. Instead, Guatemala in-
creased the intensity of its rhetoric about acquiring the
Belizean territory. For the remainder of the 1960s and
into the 1970s, formal negotiations were not attempted.
In 1971, the Belizean government initiated a
resumption of diplomatic efforts towards resolving the
dispute. They had no sooner begun in early 1972 than
they were canceled due to a Guatemalan charge that Britain
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was presenting a "threat to the Americas." 47 Britain had, in
fact, dispatched large numbers of military forces to Belize
to participate in a previously announced exercise.
Guatemala had also been building up troop strength in its
northern regions near the Belize border—supposedly to
mount an offensive against guerilla activities but,
allegedly, to carry out an invasion of Belize.
Regardless, Guatemala filed a formal protest with the
Organization of American States (OAS) and called for sanc-
tions against the United Kingdom. In response, Jamaica's
OAS representative and Belizean Premier George Price lobbied
successfully on Belize's behalf such that Guatemala withdrew
its request for sanctions due to its impending failure.
Jamaica and Belize were able to make it clear that Guatemala
presented far more of a threat to Belize than the British
troops in Belize presented to Guatemala. During the OAS
discussions, the United Kingdom invited an OAS observer to
examine the Belize based British forces. The observer re-
ported that the British forces in Belize were of a defensive
49
nature and posed no threat to Guatemala.
During 1975, Guatemala appeared once again to be stag-
ing its military for an invasion of Belize. In response,
the United Kingdom provided military reinforcements for
Belize. Guatemala was clearly the aggressor in this inci-
dent and no protests were filed as a result of the British
show of strength.
Despite Guatemala's repeated military belligerence in
the mid 1970s, it was still willing to reenter negotiations
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with the United Kingdom in 1977. These talks were barely
underway in Washington, D. C. , when once again Guatemala
aligned its armed forces along the Belizean border for an
apparent invasion. British troops returned once more to
supplement a small defensive garrison. This time they re-
mained to act as an in place deterrent against any future
Guatemalan aggression.
Through 1977, the negotiation attempts had never met
with success because of Guatemala's insistence on territo-
rial cessions and Belize's insistence on maintaining its
territorial integrity. In a December 1977 speech at the
United Nations, Belizean Premier Price addressed both the
issue of Guatemala's territorial claim and its military
belligerence. He stated:
They (Guatemala) stated that land cession in the
southern part of Belize was essential to Guatemala for
political, security and economic reasons and that no
settlement was conceivable without territorial
cession ....
. . . the Guatemalan military machine had prepared
for war and was poised to invade Belize, . . Seeing
the imminent danger to our survival as a country, the
Belize government requested British reinforcements . . .
(that) came in time to save Belize from invasion.
Despite Guatemala's military threats of 1977, the
negotiations continued, and Britain even suggested a small
cession of Belizean territory in the southern Toledo dis-
trict. Belizeans were outraged that Britain would even
consider a cession of Belizean territory. The international
community .that had arisen in support of Belize also voiced
its rejection of any idea that compromised Belize's territo-
rial integrity. As a result of the apparent willingness by
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the United Kingdom to include land cession as a negotiatory
bargaining chip, a meeting was held in New York City among
representatives of the United Kingdom, the Belizean Govern-
ment, and the Belizean Opposition. As a result of this
meeting, a Memorandum of Understanding was issued on 2 June
1978. The document contained six major points which in-
cluded an agreement which allowed for the participation by
all three of the parties that met for the New York meeting
in any future negotiations with Guatemala. The Memorandum
also required that any negotiated settlement would be placed
before the public in a referendum and, perhaps most impor-
tantly, it included the agreement that the Belize issue of
independence was distinct and separate from any settlement
of the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute. Until this agreement,
Belize's long delayed independence from the United Kingdom
had been contingent upon a resolution of the Guatemalan
threat. This was no longer to remain an obstacle.
After a change of government in Guatemala in 1978,
negotiations reopened. British proposals no longer included
land offerings, but they did include some substantial bene-
fits for Guatemala. These included a joint road building
program, a maritime right of access for Guatemala's east
coast ports and assurances that no foreign troops, other
than British, would ever be based in Belize. Guatemala
rejected these proposals late in 1978 and maintained its
53position of requiring the cession of land.
The cumulative negotiating efforts of the 1970s thus
left the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute no closer to resolution
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than it had ever been. The parties were also not to return
to any formal talks until March 1981. These negotiations
proved to be very promising. They did in fact contribute
greatly towards bringing Belize to independence on
21 September 1981; however, they did not resolve the Anglo-
Guatemalan dispute. After an examination of the development
of the Belizean decolonization and independence movement,
this chapter will return to review the 1981 negotiations
which contributed to the establishment of Belize's
"dependent" independence.
Independence Movement
The events of World War II spawned the birth of many
new and independent countries from former colonial posses-
sions and this trend towards independence did not escape
British Honduras.
On the evening of 31 December 1949, a group of men,
united in their opposition towards British pressure to join
the newly created West Indies Federation, and in their
concern for their national economy and the persistent
Guatemalan threat, established an organization known as the
People's Committee. George Price was one of the creators
of this organization and he served as its secretary. The
political opinions of the People's Committee became publi-
cized in a local Belizean newspaper through which the group
gained much popular support. They were quickly labeled
anti-British, however, by the local colonial government.
By 19 September 1950, the People's Committee evolved
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into a political party, the People's United Party (PUP). It
quickly became involved in a 20 November 1950 local election
of the Belize City Council where five of six PUP candidates
won seats on the nine member council. This early support
was representative of the widespread appeal of the PUP and
its political positions. It was also a clear sign to the
British colonial government that real change was at hand.
In the meantime, a constitutional review begun by
Britain in 1948 for the purpose of ascertaining British
Honduras' readiness for constitutional advancement towards
independence was nearing completion. On 30 April 1951, the
draft constitution report was published. It recommended
"caution" in planning British Honduras' constitutional ad-
vancement. 5 The PUP immediately classified the report a
farce, and demanded self-government at once. Very shortly
after this, the colonial government dissolved the Belize
City Council. Its specific reasoning had to do with dis-
loyalty to the Royal Family due to the Council's failure to
hang a portrait of the King of England in their council
chambers. In effect this "blatant abuse of power" by the
colonial government strengthened the PUP's determination in
its struggle against colonialism and for self-
determination. New elections were held for the Belize
City Council on 29 March 1952 and despite British efforts to
dilute the PUP's strength through both arrest and disqualifi-
cation of candidates, and through proportional representa-
tion, the party still won three seats.
The PUP geared its campaign for the 1954 national
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elections of the Legislative Asembly as a "crusade against
5 8colonialism.
"
JO Its rivals and the colonial government in
turn labeled the PUP "openly disloyal and subversive." 59
Despite the efforts of the PUP's opponents, the PUP won
eight of nine seats in the fifteen member Legislative
Assembly—the other six members were appointed.
PUP Vice-President George Price was one of the victo-
rious candidates in the 1954 election. Mr. Price had been
elected his party's vice-president at its first convention
in 1951. He later became its president on 27 September 1956
when a party split over the Federation issue led the pre-
vious president to create a new party.
In 1957, Legislative Assembly elections were held
again and the PUP carried all nine of the elected seats
using an effective campaign aimed against the Federation.
George Price was elevated to membership on the Executive
Council of the Legislative Assembly following the 1957 elec-
tion, but he was later expelled for having had a supposedly
secret meeting with a Guatemalan Minister while on a trip to
London. u Mr. Price had openly supported a position that
Belize's future must include greater economic integration
with the Central American countries. Many also believed him
to favor some sort of political association with Guatemala
as a method of remedying the Guatemalan territorial claim.
He did not favor this position, although his political
opponents were faithful in their efforts to try to capita-
lize on any inferred Price-Guatemala connection.
Although Mr. Price lost his seat on the Executive
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Council, he retained his seat in the Assembly and he in fact
became the Deputy Speaker. While in this position, however,
he was arrested for seditious libel, yet never convicted,
for comments made concerning an upcoming visit by Princess
Margaret. Mr. Price was clearly not a favorite among the
colonial administration, yet he was a favorite and popular
national spokesman for Belizean independence.
In 1959, another constitutional review was conducted.
On 1 September, Sir Hilary Blood, the Commissioner for
Constitutional Reform presented his recommendations. In
agreement with the 1951 report, he too recommended that
British Honduras proceed slowly with constitutional advance-
ment. He cited the Guatemalan complication, Belizeans sim-
ply not being ready for independence and PUP positions
favoring independence with alignment more towards Central
America and the United Nations than with the Commonwealth.
In response to the Blood Report, the Legislative
Assembly voted on 18 December 1959 to send a bipartisan
delegation to London to seek further constitutional advance-
ment. A United Front was formed by members of the PUP and
the National Independence Party (NIP) and they carried their
case to London in 1960. They were successful in negotiat-
ing a new constitution that carried Belize one step closer
towards independence. Among the changes of the new consti-
tution was the expansion of the Legislative Assembly to
twenty-five seats including eighteen elected seats. The
leader of the majority party was also called the First
Minister. This constitution took effect in March 1961 after
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the general elections scheduled for that year. The PUP won
all of the eighteen seats and Mr. Price became the first,
First Minister.
Although the British Honduran colonial administration
was initially very hostile to the PUP and its goals, by the
late 1950s "Britain began to think in terms of liquidating
the residue of her empire in the Caribbean." 65 A London
Times editorial stated:
This territory is no longer of any conceivable economic
or strategic use ... it absorbs large sums of
development money . . . which are difficult to justify
economically. 6 °
At the colonial governor's urging, another constitu-
tional conference was held in London during July 1963 to
discuss possible independence for British Honduras. Because
of the unresolved Guatemalan territorial claim and potential
military threat, independence was still not seen as a viable
option yet, but Britain did write another new constitution
for British Honduras that granted full internal self-
government on 1 January 1964.
Under the new self-governing constitution the legisla-
tive structure became bicameral with an eight member ap-
pointed Senate and an eighteen member elected House of
Representatives. The period between elections was stretched
from three to five years and the names were changed for a
few positions. The First Minister became the Premier, and
the Executive Council became the Cabinet. The Premier was
selected by a British appointed Governor from among the
majority party within the House of Representatives. Conse-
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quently, George Price became the first Premier of British
Honduras
.
One other topic dealt with during the 1963 constitu-
tional conference was a name change for the country. The
name Belize had already long been in use throughout Central
America and British Honduras, but especially among the mem-
bership of the PUP. The PUP had in fact resolved to have
the name of the country altered to Belize at its very first
party convention in 1951. In 1963, the British agreed to
the name change for British Honduras but it was not to be
effective until its attainment of full independence, which
was expected and understood to be the next step in constitu-
tional advancement. Since independence did not come as soon
as anticipated, Britain eventually relented and allowed
British Honduras to officially become Belize on
1 June 1973. 67
In March 1965, elections were held for the first time
under the new constitution. George Price maintained his
position as Premier and the PUP continued to dominate the
House of Representatives by maintaining sixteen seats. It
was during the PUP's 1965 campaign and the year that fol-
lowed that the Belize Government sought to internationalize
its quest for independence and the Guatemalan territorial
claim. The 1965 election Manifesto stated: "The PUP Govern-
ment will send a delegation to the United Nations to make
known to the whole world the Belizean unbreakable will to
self-determine its independence on the Central American
mainland." 68 Belize did send a delegation to the United
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Nations in 1967, but its primary focus initially was in
internationalizing its plight in smaller regional and inter-
national organizations. Belize's international support
slowly developed through the 1970s and finally culminated in
the 139-0 approval of a November 1980 United Nations' reso-
lution calling for Belizean independence. The fourth chapter
will provide a thorough review of Belize's diplomatic ini-
tiative to internationalize its plight.
Belize's international involvement was clearly moti-
vated by its quest for independence—more specifically, the
PUP Government's and George Price's quest for independence.
The PUP maintained political power in Belize throughout the
1970s. It maintained seventeen seats in the 1969 elections,
twelve seats in the 1974 elections, and thirteen seats in
the 1979 election. Throughout this time, George Price re-
mained the Premier. PUP political campaigns and political
actions all revolved around the single issue of indepen-
dence. Two of only nine articles which comprise the PUP
Political Creed reiterate the preponderance of this issue.
The creed states:
I am a member of the People's United Party, because I
believe:
[ ]
4. that every Belizean is an integral part of the
nation and has a right and duty to participate
in the building of the INDEPENDENT BELIZE.
[ ]
9. that the new nation of Belize has a right to exist
as a free, sovereign and independent nation of
Central America in the heart of the Caribbean
Basin. 69
Belize's diplomatic initiative to internationalize its
quest for independence gained its first major success at the
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1975 Summit of the Commonwealth of Nations. 70 A resolution
endorsing Belizean independence passed unanimously. This
included the United Kingdom's support, however it still felt
confined by Guatemala's territorial claim and military
threat. It was generally believed in Britain and Belize,
that if the British troops that had guarded Belize since
1977 ever left, that Guatemala would invade. Because of
this paradox, Belize sought to secure some sort of defense
guarantee for a post independence Belize. As early as 1975,
the PUP Government had indicated that it was
. . . not prepared to allow this threat indefinitely to
postpone the independence of Belize and is prepared to
assume . . . any suitable security arrangement that will
ensure the safety of the people of Belize and preserve
the independence of Belize.
During Belize's 1970s participation in international forums
it sought especially hard to gain the commitment of other
countries to join in a multinational defense force for
Belize. Although many were supportive of the idea, none
were willing to commit themselves on Belize's behalf.
After the success of the 1980 United Nations resolu-
tion calling for Belize's independence, the United Kingdom
committed itself to bring Belize to independence before the
end of 1981. Britain hoped earnestly for a negotiated
settlement with Guatemala, but, it was not to be. Remaining
true to its word, Britain brought Belize to independence on
21 September 1981 in spite of the "lingering obstacle" that
had previously prevented complete constitutional advancement
73




The idea of some sort of security guarantee for an
independent, but threatened Belize had been discussed for
some time in both the British and Belizean press. The
general consensus, up until 1980, was that Britain would
never be willing to provide any defense for an independent
Belize. This was in fact the stated policy of the British
Labor Governments that dominated the 1970s. In 1977, a
letter from an official in the British Foreign Office
stated: "I can confirm that it is our general policy not to
engage in defence commitments to ex-dependent territories
once they achieve full independence." An analysis of the
Belize issue in 1978 also stated: "Britain for its part is
keen for Belize to become independent but it is not prepared
to make exceptions by shielding Belize with a post indepen-
7 Sdence defence treaty." With the victory of the British
Conservative Party in 1979, British willingness to make an
exception to this policy seemed to be forthcoming.
An August 1980 Times article indicated that the new
Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher was "determined
to press for a solution." 76 Only three months later, a
November article indicated that independence was at hand and
that it would include provisions for the stationing of
troops in Belize to prevent a Guatemalan invasion— in short,
a defense guarantee. An earlier article in the Belizean
magazine Brukdown had also indicated that, "Whitehall will
confer independence on the colony regardless of whether
Guatemalan and British diplomats reach an agreement to set-
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tie the century old dispute." 78 The article also indicated
that Britain was "firm in its commitment to provide a de-
79fence guarantee."' 3 A December 1980 Times article further
stated that an announcement by the Lord Privy Seal, Sir Ian
Gilmore, indicated independence would be granted to Belize
by the end of 1981, that the "British government will not
allow this dispute to stand in the way of its new timetable
ft nfor independence. l,ou
Amid these stories, negotiations among British,
Guatemalan and Belizean representatives began in London to
discuss once again the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute. The talks
culminated in what was hailed as a "dramatic break-
ft 1through. "°-L On 11 March 1981, the three parties issued the
news that they had signed a document which established
headings for an agenda of agreements that were yet to be
negotiated. This document became identified as the Heads of
Agreement. The major significance of this document was that
Guatemala agreed to drop its territorial claim to Belize.
Following the successful negotiations, the Belizean negotia-
tors returned to a hero's welcome in Belize City. On
16 March 1981, Premier Price addressed his very optimistic
nation. He stated:
On Wednesday morning, the 11th of March 1981, I joined
Minister Nicholas Ridley of the United Kingdom and
Foreign Minister Rafael Castillo Valdez of Guatemala, in
signing an agreement setting out a framework within
which the long-standing dispute over Belizean territory
between these two nations may be honourably and finally
settled. 82
Upon the signing of the Heads of Agreement, Britain
was so optimistic that it scheduled a constitutional confer-
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ence for Belize for the first week of April. It was felt
that a new constitution for an independent Belize could
finally be drafted. Premier Price planned on attending this
conference but he was unfortunately detained at home due to
a State of Emergency that was established in the face of
violent opposition and riots. These uprisings were waged by
a small minority of Belizeans that flagrantly opposed the
provisions of the Heads of Agreement. They accused Premier
o -j
Price of selling out his country.
Regardless, the constitutional conference was con-
ducted in London from 4-16 April. Mr. Nicholas Ridley
presented the opening speech. He stated:
I take no pleasure, nor do any of us, that this highly
important event has been so long delayed, nevertheless,
it is a great satisfaction that the work which we began
in the latest round of talks with the Guatemalans . . .
has prospered. It enables us to take the important step
of meeting in conference to consider constitutional
provisions for the new nation of Belize, shortly to
achieve its independence.
Mr. Ridley went on to express optimism over the Heads of
Agreement negotiations that were to resume in May and he
indicated that the outcome of these negotiations would
determine what sort of defense provisions, if any, that
Belize would need. He concluded by reiterating:
I want, ... to make clear now that for its part Her
Majesty's Government intends to make arrangements for
future security of Belize which will be appropriate to
the circumstances, whatever they may be.
Mr. Ridley also visited Belize in early May to meet
with Premier Price and his Cabinet to discuss the next steps
towards independence and the upcoming resumption of negotia-
tions over the Heads of Agreement. While in Belize he
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reaffirmed that the British government was honor bound to
grant Belize its independence in 1981. 86
The Heads of Agreement negotiations resumed in New
York City on 20 May 1981. They were reportedly productive
but not conclusive. Additional talks were scheduled for
June but were then postponed until July. Upon their resump-
tion on 6 July, it became apparent that the negotiators were
at an impasse. One of the provisions of the Heads of Agree-
ment called for Guatemala to have the "use and enjoyment" of
two small cays off the southern coast of Belize. 87 Belizean
intent was for Belize to maintain sovereignty over the
islands but to allow Guatemalans access to them for recrea-
tional use. During the July negotiations, however, it be-
came clear from Guatemala that it wanted the islands forever
Q Q
in order to establish military and naval bases. Belize
adamantly refused to allow these new Guatemalan demands and
the talks ended. Despite this disagreement, the talks ended
amicably and there was still some hope of renewed negotia-
tions to further resolve the unsettled agenda items of the
Heads of Agreement. Following his return from the failed
talks, Premier Price addressed his nation and stated:
It is unlikely that the Heads of Agreement can be made
into treaties before the end of the United Nations
Plenary session this year; nevertheless, our policy of a
secure independence with all our territory will proceed
along the other road, that is. an independence with a
suitable security guarantee.
Only a week following the collapsed talks, Premier
Price flew to London to negotiate the final arrangements for
independence. After only four days of meetings, he returned
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with the news that Independence Day was set for 21 September
1981. He also returned with a communique on the British
defense arrangement. It was a time-vague commitment that
only guaranteed a British military presence in Belize for an
"appropriate period."
The defense communique had also called for the crea-
tion of a multinational defense force to eventually replace
the British and for an increase in the strength of the
Belizean Defense Force (BDF). The BDF had only recently
been created on 1 January 1978 as Belize's first standing
army. In 1981, it still consisted of only several hundred
men and women. The idea of a multinational defense force
was for it to be comprised of participants from the Common-
wealth of Nations or the United Nations. This had earlier
gained the appeal of the PUP Government but its efforts
toward recruiting countries willing to commit themselves on
Belize's behalf had not met with success.
Premier Price's announcement of independence with a
defense guarantee met very mixed receptions. Guatemala was
very angry. It broke off consular relations with Britain
and it closed its border with Belize. It also withdrew its
earlier renouncement of Belizean territory and returned to
its original territorial claim to all of Belize. Within
Belize, while Premier Price was very optimistic, both oppo-
nents and supporters of his Government were concerned about
the time-vague character of the British defense guarantee.
Brukdown, which usually seemed to offer a fair and
wide range of opinions on the Government, printed articles
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concerning the upcoming Independence Day that did not share
Premier Price's optimism. Articles appeared with titles
such as, "September 21: Tomorrow's Noon is Today. ..but is It
Freedom or Fool's Gold?" 91 "!Hoy Independencia! PManana
Que?" 92 and "Independence: Ritual or Reality?" 93 A dominant
feeling among Belizeans seemed to be that their independence
was a rather empty one since it came only with British
defense support—support that was not considered likely to
remain for very long. One Belizean journalist, expressing a
very cynical view of British trustworthiness with regard to
the anticipated length of the "appropriate period" wrote:
If history has taught anything it is that British
diplomacy is nothing if not perfidious. In fact the
continuing saga of the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute
represents a textbook study of the use of arrogance,
duplicity*, and penury in the conduct of foreign
affairs
.
Despite the critics, Belize did celebrate its indepen-
dence on 21 September 1981. The celebrations were a joyous
occasion for most, but overall it was not a grand affair.
The fact that a sudden downpour washed out a barge fireworks
display and almost postponed the official raising ceremony
of the Belizean flag, was perhaps prophetic for the new
Belize. Representatives from sixty-one countries partici-
pated in the festivities, but the official government oppo-
sition party, the United Democratic Party (UDP) boycotted
them. Britain sent a member of the Royal Family to repre-
sent the Crown but Prince Michael of Kent was largely an
unknown distant cousin. The major United States weeklies
were sent to cover the celebration but Time did not even run
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its story until one week after U.S.News . 95 Their articles
reflected the same pessimism as those in Belize. Joseph
Bernham's "In Belize, One Weak Cheer for Independence" in
U.S.News noted that there was a general ambivalence towards
independence and that there were no mass celebrations. In
Britain, the London Sunday Times Magazine did print a fea-
ture article on Belize but two days following Independence
Day an unflattering article also appeared in the Times that
Q 7
mentioned the open sewers of Belize City.
While many were indeed critical and suspicious of
Belize's new independence, it was nevertheless a new inde-
pendent country. George Price's PUP Government had finally
succeeded in its long sought goal. However, he was to learn
quickly, "that independence does not quite mean what it
says." Belize did little more than begin a new dependent
independence. The minimal diminishment of the British pres-
ence was inconsequential due to the maintenance of British
military forces. Belize remained clearly dependent on
Britain for its defense against the lingering Guatemalan
threat. It also remained financially dependent upon Britain
and other countries whose generosity had long provided a
staple of Belize's economic base. Belize had however, suc-
ceeded remarkably in gaining the respect and admiration of
the world body. Belize had become a new international actor
in its own right. The mere representation of sixty-one
countries at Belize's Independence Day festivities testifies
vividly to this. This paper will further examine Belize's
international relations after a brief look at its ongoing
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BELIZE, GUATEMALA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM
Negotiations
Upon Belize's attainment of independence, the United
Kingdom sought with renewed dedication to resolve the Anglo-
Guatemalan dispute. It hoped the "appropriate period" of
its military involvement would be minimal. Belize, like-
wise, was dissatisfied with the situation which mandated a
continued British military presence and, in effect, created
a dependent independence. Since the continuing Guatemalan
threat was the sole reason for this state of affairs, Prime
Minister Price took advantage of his first opportunity in an
international forum, as an independent nation, to address
this issue. Speaking at the United Nations only four days
after attaining independence, he said:
. . . a neighbour to which we extend the hand of
friendship and the offer of economic regional
co-operation has not responded yet to our invitation.
Yet we stand ready to pursue the formula for peace
agreed upon by the United Kingdom, Guatemala and Belize
in a determined endeavour to search for a peaceful
solution of the dispute between the United Kingdom and
Guatemala, . . .
The formula for peace to which Mr. Price referred, was
the May 1981 Heads of Agreement. Belize and the United
Kingdom were still satisfied with its provisions and they
hoped to continue to try to persuade Guatemala to accept
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them. In December 1981, Prime Minister Price extended an
invitation to Guatemala to renew their treaty negotiations,
and to invest in Belize. 2 Guatemala refused Mr. Price's
request for negotiations, stating that Guatemala would deal
only with Britain, however, it did agree to open the
Guatemala-Belize border for trade on 1 January 1982. 3
In early 1982, it appeared from the British perspec-
tive, that its appropriate period of military involvement
might be drawing to a close. It seemed the reason for
remaining in Belize—to avert a Guatemalan threat—was no
longer a pressing issue. The United States had recently
announced plans to provide military and economic aid to
Belize under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and, the new
Guatemalan government of President Rios Mott seemed far less
threatening. Although President Rios Mott had abolished the
Guatemalan constitution which maintained Guatemala's
Belizean claim, he governed under a Fundamental Governing
Statute which included the statement: "Guatemala maintains
its rights in relation to Belizean territory." Despite
this, he still seemed more amenable to peaceful negotia-
tions. He had also pledged that Guatemala would not use its
military power to recoup Belizean territory. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the United Kingdom was fearful of
becoming embroiled in a Central American conflagration. An
April 1982 London Times article indicated that the "threat
from Guatemala was more rhetorical than real."-' It further
stated:
Britain is seeking an early withdrawal because of the
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cost and because the government, concerned that it
could find itself being sucked into the political
turbulence spreading across Central America, does not
wish to maintain a defence commitment to a state which
has become fully independent.
By October 1982, President Rios Mott indicated he was
ready to resume negotiations. Later that year, in
December, he also indicated to United States President
Reagan that Guatemala wanted a negotiated settlement on
Belize in lieu of any type of military solution.
With renewed optimism, negotiations finally began in
New York City on 24 January 1983, for the first time since
qBelizean independence. They ended very abruptly, however,
when Guatemala indicated it would limit its territorial
claim from all of Belize to only the southern district of
Toledo, comprising a mere third of the country. Belize
rebuffed this supposedly conciliatory gesture and adamantly
refused to cede any territory. Guatemala consequently re-
turned to its original claim to all of Belize.
Following the failure of the January talks, the
British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Francis Pym, indicated that
both sides seemed as far apart as ever at trying to reach a
settlement. 12 President Rios Mott's hard line negotiating
stance on Belizean territory was seen by many as simply an
effort to arouse nationalistic sentiment and to in turn
divert attention from the ongoing brutal repression and
economic crisis of Guatemala. Regardless, the 1983 nego-
tiations ended almost as soon as they began and no
Guatemalan efforts towards resuming talks were made again
until May 1984. 14

39
During this interim, Belize tried repeatedly to pursue
a negotiated settlement. Prime Minister Price's 1983
Independence Day speech was an especially fervent cry for
peace. He stated:
To those who claim our land and cause us needless
worry, we hold out the hand of friendship. We ask that
they respect and recognize our right to determine our
future as a nation free and sovereign within the land
and sea boundaries of Belize, which existed even before
the independence of Central America, for we wish to
live in peace and harmony with all our neighbours, of
the region and with nations of the world. 5
Only a month prior to this speech, President Rios Mott
of Guatemala was overthrown in a military coup. His re-
placement, General Mejia Victores, maintained Guatemala's
belligerent position of claiming territorial rights to all
of Belize.
Within the United Kingdom, concern focused on the
defense agreement for Belize and the lingering presence of
British armed forces. The House of Commons was especially
interested in the extent of the defense agreement. It was
seen to be an agreement that involved an "open ended commit-
ment that the United Kingdom had entered to defend a country
over whose foreign and defence policy Britain no longer had
any control." It had been negotiated in secret by the
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and despite demands by the
House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee to have its
contents revealed, the Government refused.
In May 1984, preliminary meetings were held among
negotiators from the United Kingdom, Guatemala and Belize,
to further plan for talks in July. During the talks in
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July, it was reported in Belize that Guatemala negotiated
directly with Belize for the first time. 7 This was seen as
significant, because, in past negotiations, although repre-
sentatives of all three countries were usually present, the
Guatemalans had always conducted bilateral discussions with
the British—Belize had simply been an observer. Interest-
ingly, Guatemalan perspectives on the July 1984 talks conti-
nued to view Belize strictly as an observer, despite
l ftBelizean perceptions.
Reports from the negotiations in July were initially
very optimistic. At one point, Guatemala was "reported to
have dropped its demands for territorial concessions" and to
have instead been concentrating "on changes in the maritime
1 9boundaries off the Atlantic Coast." It was also stated
that the present Guatemalan Government's attitude was "very
close to recognition" of Belize. Guatemala's Foreign
Minister, Fernando Andrade, was reported to be "keen to
settle the country's dispute with Belize." He also pro-
posed the renewal of consular level diplomatic relations
with the United Kingdom. The most optimistic news from
these ongoing negotiations occurred after an August 1984
meeting of the three leading contenders for the Guatemalan
presidency and government officials of the United States.
The United States was credited with having engineered
a rapprochement plan between Guatemala and Belize, whereby a
new Guatemalan constitution would be written to eliminate a
claim to sovereignty over Belize and Guatemala would offi-
cially recognize Belize. 23 One of the participants in these
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meetings, Jorge Carpio Nicolle of the Union of the National
Center (UCN), intimated that the Guatemalan Government
"tacitly accepted Belizean independence . . ." but that
"future governments must be guided by a more realistic
vision of the old dispute." 24 Another participant, Vinicio
Cerezo Arevalo of the Christian Democratic Party (DCG),
indicated that his party "recognized Belize as a 'different
country 1 and that he would like to have the issue put to a
national referendum." 5
Unfortunately, these discussions and plans were to be
only those of a new Government, and, although the current
military Government did seem conciliatory and amenable to
continuing negotiations, it was not prepared to implement
any changes. In fact, during a fall meeting of the
Organization of American States, Guatemala continued to
reject Belize's status as an independent state. Similarly,
Guatemala even refused to allow a Belizean softball team to
participate in an October 1984 meet of the Regional Softball
Federation that was to be hosted by Guatemala. Conse-
quently, the meet was moved by the Federation to Puerto Rico
in order to insure Belize's participation. °
Despite these minor setbacks, optimism was still high
through 1984 for a final negotiated settlement. Belize was
in the midst of ongoing negotiations in late 1984, when
governmental elections were held. Since the Opposition won
for the first time ever, the negotiations were postponed
until the new Government had adequately prepared. Despite
this change in the Belizean Government, Guatemalan Foreign

42
Minister Andrade reaffirmed his country's willingness to
negotiate and "to maintain and fortify" its relations with
2 7Belize. Just prior to the resumption of negotiations sche-
duled for New York City on 12 Febraury 1985, Guatemala
seemed once again to be shifting back to its larger territo-
rial claims. The Guatemalan negotiator was apparently
instructed to reiterate Guatemala's claims to Belizean ter-
ritory. This position reflected a much tougher posture than
any that Guatemala had espoused since the resumption of the
talks in July 1984. The abrupt shift was attributed to
differences among the ruling military leaders because of
their fears that the upcoming presidential elections were
likely to be lost to the more liberal Christian Democrats.
Among the military leaders, one group favored a more
pragmatic approach to the Belize issue. They felt discus-
sions should not concentrate on "territorial cessions of
little practical value for the Guatemalan economy" but
rather on "economic objectives such as free ports, pipeline
rights, and sea lanes." The far right-wing of the mili-
tary, however, believed that a tougher position on Belize
gained much greater popular appeal and was therefore more
beneficial in providing greater support for the military
dominated National Liberation Movement (MLN) party and can-
didate. 30
The new Belizean Government of the United Democratic
Party (UDP) had approached the February negotiations with a
willingness to implement the provisions of the old 1981
Heads of Agreement, despite their previous adamant opposi-
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tion. The talks did begin as scheduled on 12 February 1985
at the United Nations in New York. Unfortunately, with
Guatemala having returned to a hard line position requiring
the cession of land, and with the UDP Government being no
more willing to cede land than the previous Government, the
talks were no more productive than those of the previous 126
years. Although talks were reportedly continuing in March
1985, Guatemalan Foreign Minister Fernando Andrade has indi-
cated that Guatemala will not seek to find a final solution
until after Guatemala's as yet unscheduled but upcoming
presidential elections.
Military Relations
During Belize's first Independence Day festivities,
the Honorable Nicholas Ridley, the British Minister of State
at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the ranking
member of the visiting British delegation, gave a speech
wherein he indicated that the United Kingdom was "happy to
provide the time and security" within which Belize could lay
1
2
to rest its dispute with Guatemala. The security to which
Mr. Ridley referred had to do with the British defense
guarantee that Britain agreed to provide upon Belize's
attainment of independence. The actual provisions of the
defense agreement were signed in December 1981, but, no
details were ever revealed beyond the commitment that
British forces would be maintained for an "appropriate pe-
riod" within Belize to act as a deterrent against Guatemalan
military aggression. An "appropriate period" was generally
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interpreted to mean that British troops would remain in
Belize until a Guatemalan settlement had been conducted, or
at least until such time that the Guatemalan threat sub-
sided. In a press interview during the independence cele-
bration, Prime Minister Price was asked if he wanted the
British to stay in Belize as long as there was not an agree-
ment with Guatemala. He responded: "We would like them to
stay until the need of their presence disappears. Part of




The size of the British forces that remained in Belize
at independence was roughly the same as it had been since
1977 when Belize requested military aid in the face of an
impending Guatemalan invasion. These forces consisted of
1800 men— 300 of which were Gurkhas, a flight of four
Harrier jump-jets and two flights of helicopters comprised
of eight Pumas. Although the figure for troop strength
has varied in press accounts during the past four years
from 1100 to 1800 men, the military presence in 1985 remains
is
much as it did in 1977.
Britain's early hopes were that its appropriate period
of military involvement in an independent Belize would be
over by the end of 1982. 6 Government statements and press
articles appeared in April which seemed to reiterate this
deadline. The Falklands Crisis of May 1982, however, led
Britain to renege on any intended withdrawal deadlines.
During the midst of the Falklands Crisis, Britain gave its
reassurances of support to Belize that it would not back
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down on its commitment. ' Britain was reportedly embar-
rassed by the successful Argentine invasion of the Falklands
and it was intent on not allowing a similar invasion of
Belize. 38
The British military presence in Belize was occas-
sionally supplemented by routine visits of British ships.
In September 1982, a British frigate visited; and in
February 1983 the British jump- jet carrier, HMS Invinsible
did also. Prince Andrew was one of the visiting crew mem-
bers of the HMS Invinsible. Although his presence was not
as an official representative of the Crown, he was the first
immediate member of the Royal Family to visit the indepen-
dent Belize. ^
During this time period, Britain's military commitment
to Belize seemed solid, however, there was some anxiety in
Whitehall when U. S. President Reagan made overtures of
renewing aid to Guatemala. It was felt that any new mili-
tary aid to Guatemala could only further threaten Belize
and British troops. Regardless, Britain's support to Belize
in early 1983 remained solid.
In August 1983, an editorial appeared in the London
Times supporting the continued British presence in Belize.
It expressed optimism that the likelihood of Guatemala
attempting any military action against Belize was remote in
view of Guatemala's hands being tied to internal problems.
It further indicated that the presence was probably "comfor-
ting to Washington" and that it was an honorable presence
and a cost effective contribution to the United States'
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search for stability in an area of crucial interest to
them. 40
An article in an August 1983 Latin America Weekly
Report had a similar focus. It stated that it was:
. . . ironic that 'appropriate 1 in many peoples minds,
has less to do with the Guatemalan threat than with the
growing fear that an East-West military conflagration
in the South could spread to engulf Belize.
It further stated that it was:
. . . generally assumed that the strong British
presence will constitute a credible deterrent to any
such rumblings and at the same time relieve the U. S.
of the need overtly to defend Central America's north-
eastern flank.
Despite this perceived additional usefulness for the
British forces, stories began circulating in October of
1983, that indicated the British would withdraw their troops
by the end of 1984. Their commitment was "considered no
longer feasible." Speculation also began concerning
whether or not the U. S. would step in to fill the void
created by a British departure. The United States was
noncommittal as to the speculation concerning its military
future in Belize, but it was not without opinion in its
support for a continued British presence. President Reagan
reportedly convinced Prime Minister Thatcher to maintain the
British forces beyond her 1984 deadline in a meeting in
January 1984. 45 Other actions by Mr. Reagan in February 1984
did not however endear him to Mrs. Thatcher. He decided to
renew non-lethal military equipment sales to Guatemala.
This consisted of spare parts for helicopters. Mrs.
Thatcher immediately sent a formal letter of protest to the
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U. S. President, citing the threat that any military aid to
Guatemala would impose on her British troops. 4 ^
At the end of 1984, British troops were not withdrawn,
but in late December, Mrs. Thatcher was said to be "anxious
to end the military presence as rapidly as possible." 47
February 1985 was the last reported deadline for a British
troop withdrawal; but, that date too has come and gone and
British troops remain, serving time in Belize for their
A Q
"appropriate period."
The British are clearly no longer as "happy to provide
the time and security" that Mr. Nicholas Ridley spoke of so
cheerfully in 1981. British feelings are perhaps best
summed up in the words of a British army official assigned
to the British forces in Belize. He stated: "We don't want
to be here, ... We want to get out of here. The U. K. is
4 9trying to move away from being a colonial power." Although
the British may be unhappy to remain in Belize, the majority
of Belizeans are quite happy to have them remain.
One of the things that the British forces have done,
in addition to providing a deterrent from their mere pres-
ence, is to provide training and support to the Belizean
Defense Force (BDF). The BDF was created through British
support on 1 January 1978, with the intent of eventually
having it provide the defensive garrison that Belize needed.
Although the BDF has grown to a fighting force of over seven
hundred men and women, it is unlikely to ever reach credible
strength to maintain the defense of Belize on its own. This
is due largely to the problems of finding suitable recruits
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from among the small population of only 160,000 people 50
In August 1983, Britain provided two Defender aircraft
to the BDF. 51 They were multipurpose aircraft capable of
carrying cargo, troops, bombs, machine guns and missiles.
Their primary mission, however, was planned to be land and
maritime surveillance and patrol. Just over a year later,
in September 1984, the British also provided the BDF with
two twenty meter patrol boats. 52 They were small coast guard
cutter type craft, equipped with fifty calibre machine guns
and radar. Britain not only supplied this equipment to the
BDF, it has also provides over two million pounds annually
towards its upkeep and operation, in addition to providing
British military officers which command the Belizean troops,
fly the aircraft and drive the boats.
For obvious reasons, it should seem clear that the
Belizeans do not want the British forces to leave. It has
been said that with Belize's fragile independence, threat
from Guatemala, and lifeless economy, "the British troops
have come to represent the last vestige of stability."
Economic Relations
Belize's lifeless economy is largely attributed to its
own reliance on sugarcane as an export crop in the face of
falling sugar prices. 5 Although efforts have been made to
diversify its economic base, one solid and consistent con-
tributor to its economy has been the United Kingdom. Econo-
mic reasons alone are a good inducement for Belize to try
and maintain its British ties and military presence.

4 9
Part of the estimated $50 million that Britain spends
annually in support of its own forces finds its way into
Belize's economy. This money in addition to the personal
spending by the British military personnel in Belize is said
to account for ten to fifteen percent of Belize's national
income, even though the British troops comprise only one
percent of the Belizean population. 55 The British troops
most definitely spend alot of money on "beer, taxis and
weekends at the Cays."
Other than the direct and indirect economic benefits
of the military presence, the British Government has con-
tinued to offer financial aid for other programs. In fact,
much of the Belize Government's budget comes from British
aid. 57
An extensive long term bilateral agreement was signed
in November 1981 for twelve million pounds of assistance.
It included provisions for the training of Belizeans,
technical cooperation, consulting services, surveys, re-
C Q
search projects and small capital grants. The British,
prior to independence, had also initiated an extensive road
building and rehabilitation program. They have continued
this program since independence. Britain derives very lit-
tle benefit, if any, from its aid to Belize. It certainly
does not gain any financial advantage except for individual
investors. The two countries do maintain an active trade
relationship, but it is minimal from the British perspec-
tive. In 1980, only nine percent of Belize's exports went
to Britain and only twenty-one percent of Belizean imports
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were of British origin.
Overall, British-Belizean relations have remained very
strong. They have worked well together in trying to nego-
tiate with Guatemala, and Britain has continued to provide
the economic and military assistance, albeit unwantingly,
that Belize desperately needs. Certainly, Britain would
like to end its involvement. Prime Minister Thatcher has
made that very clear, however, the status quo that created
the British presence has remained largely unchanged. Conse-
quently, the "awkward diplomatic problem" of British-





In Belize's struggle to become an independent nation,
it became involved in a number of international organiza-
tions. This was a very deliberate attempt on the part of
the Belizean Government to gain the attention of the world.
Belize found it necessary to do this because of the persis-
tent Guatemalan claim to Belizean territory and because of
the United Kingdom's reluctance to grant independence to a
threatened colony. This British reluctance was gradually
overcome as Belize "skillfully presented its case before the
bar of international public opinion . . . ." 1 When Britain
finally did grant independence to Belize on 21 September
1981, the Guatemalan territorial claim--Britain's principal
reason for denying independence earlier—was still intact.
The primary reason that Britain finally reneged on its
earlier position was because of the overwhelming interna-
tional support that Belize had garnered for its cause, an
action virtually unique among small states.
Belize began its diplomatic initiative among its natu-
ral friends and allies. As it did so, these fellow coun-
tries helped to spread Belize's message, such that its
support grew exponentially from the Commonwealth Carribean
countries to the Commonwealth of Nations, and from the
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Commonwealth of Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement to the
United Nations. In gaining the audience of these interna-
tional bodies, Belize won many new friends and supporters.
Many of these, such as the Latin American countries and the
United States, had been long term Belizean adversaries in
the Belize-Guatemalan dispute.
Belize's diplomatic initiative is indeed a remarkable
success story which this chapter will unfold as it traces
the development of Belize's relationships with the interna-
tional organizations and the various countries that helped
to bring Belize to independence. What is most remarkable
about Belize's success is the skill with which it used very
limited diplomatic resources to achieve overwhelming inter-
national support. Admittedly, this diplomatic success was
not achieved solely on the skillful efforts of individuals.
The fact that Belize's cause was the near universally de-
sired cause of anti-colonialism or decolonization was a
major contributing factor.
This chapter will also illustrate how Belize has
successfully exploited its newly attained independence and
international recognition. Belize changed quickly from an
observer using certain international forums to an actual
member of these forums and others. Belize has indeed
become a new international actor.
Non-Aligned Movement
The summit meetings of Non-Aligned countries were some
of the first international forums that Belize used to es-
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pouse its view of the Guatemalan territorial claim, as well
as its own right to self-determination, sovereignty and
territorial integrity. The PUP Government had long held to
a non-aligned perspective in Belize's foreign policy. Addi-
tionally, many of the member states of the Non-Aligned
Movement shared Belize's colonial struggle and they offered
a sympathetic ear to its cries for support.
The Algiers Summit of 1973 was one of the first in
which Belize achieved some notable attention and support.
Just prior to the meeting, Carl Rogers, Belize's Deputy
Premier, undertook a trip to the Middle East and Africa to
spread Belize's message. Among other countries, he won the
support of Egypt, Lebanon, Tanzania and the Sudan. Belize
had already long been supported by two of the strongest
members of the Non-Aligned Movement—Cuba, its Caribbean
neighbor, and India, with whom it shared a British heritage.
At the Summit Conference of the Non-Aligned countries
that met August 1976 in Sri Lanka, Belizean Premier, George
Price had the opportunity to address the group. In that
session Belize's participation was that of an observer, but
Premier Price's opportunity to speak was a clear indication
that Third World attention was being gained and quickly
moving toward unanimous support of Belize. His comments
were largely directed toward seeking security arrangements
and guarantees so that Belize could proceed with decoloniza-
tion and independence, in spite of Guatemala's territorial
claim and military threats.
Throughout Belize's use of Third World forums one of
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its more vocal and faithful supporters was Cuba. Through
its own efforts, Cuba had been calling on Britain to grant
Belize its independence. Although no official offers
have ever been revealed, some have intimated that Cuba
was also willing to offer Belize the security guarantee that
Britain so reluctantly provided. Clearly, Belize did not
shy away from accepting the help of socialist governments
such as Castro's Cuba, Bishop's Grenada or Manley's Jamaica.
Belize in fact courted the Sandinistas in Nicaragua prior to
their successful revolution. Whereas Belize's relation-
ships with socialist governments were a major concern to
some—the United States in particular—Premier Price merely
explained them as being part of Belize's non-aligned posi-
tion and respecting of the very rights that Belize sought
for itself—sovereignty and self-determination.
In 1979, the summit meeting of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment was held in Havana, Cuba. A record ninety-five coun-
tries and liberation movements were represented. Belize
participated once again as an active observer, once again
being afforded the opportunity to address the group. Its
participation in 1979 was supported for the first time by
Latin American countries other than Cuba. In particular,
Belize was supported by Panama who had earlier offered its
support at the United Nations.
The meeting focused a great deal of attention to the
struggles against colonialism, the principles of non-
intervention and the rights of individual countries to
effect changes in their political, economic and social struc-
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tures. In particular, the meeting expressed its "uncondi-
tional backing of the Belizean people's inalienable right to
self-determination, independence and territorial integri-
ty." With Guatemala its obvious focus, it also condemned
all pressures and threats that would seek to prevent Belize
from full exercise of those rights. The attending heads of
state and government also urged full support from the Non-
Aligned Movement at the United Nations for the annual reso-
lutions calling for Belize's speedy progress towards imme-
diate and secure independence, with strict respect for its
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
Having begun its diplomatic initiative to win interna-
tional support for independence from among its Third World
friends, within days of having gained its independence,
Belize became a full-fledged member of the Non-Aligned Move-
ment. On 25 September 1981 Belize was admitted as the
ninety-sixth member of the organization. Only several weeks
earlier, the Belizean Attorney General, Said Musa, had
issued an official statement which reiterated Belize's spe-
cial destiny as a member of the Third World to contribute to
the evolution of a just international society.
In a press interview with Prime Minister Price, just
days after the Belizean Independence Day, a question was
asked as to whether or not Belize could survive the pres-
sures of having Cuba so close. Prime Minister Price
answered:
Cuba is a member of the Non-Aligned—the Presidency of
Non-Aligned; a member of the United Nations, a member
(not active) of the Organization of American States and
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a member of certain Caribbean Communities. Well of
course we'll have to work along with Cuba, since they
are a member of those international organizations.
But we are working with other countries too. ^
His answer clearly did not address the implications of the
question because Prime Minister Price did not seem to feel
any "pressures" from Cuba. On the contrary, Cuba offered
college scholarships to Belizean students and they were
eager to establish diplomatic and commercial ties to the
new independent Belize.
Much of Cuba's initiative was foiled by opposition
within Belize, both from the official Opposition and the
right-wing elements of the Government. In particular,
efforts by Cuba to develop its trade with Belize through the
establishment of a commercial mission in January 1982 were
stopped by the Chamber of Commerce and trade union leaders.
Only months later, Belize again parted company with Cuba as
well as the overwhelming majority of the Non-Aligned coun-
tries, when it sided with Britain over Argentina in the
Falklands War. Despite these differences, Belize continued
to identify with the Non-Aligned Movement and to use it as
an international forum to espouse its views.
At the summit meeting held at New Delhi, India, in May
of 1983, Deputy Prime Minister Rogers addressed the organi-
zation. He began by showering praise on the outgoing chair-
man of the movement, Cuban President Fidel Castro, citing
his "personal commitment ... to the ideals of peace,
justice and development. His sensitive and enlightened
chairmanship helped to steer our Movement through a very
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difficult time." Mr. Rogers went on to outline the persis-
tent threat to Belize by Guatemala's continuing claim to its
land and to suggest the role for the Non-Aligned Movement in
response to Belize predicament. He stated:
In our struggle to preserve our sovereignty and terri-
torial integrity, we are convinced that the Non-Aligned
Movement has to play a positive role, and assume a
special responsibility. If countries in predicaments
such as ours are not to be forced to have recourse to
one of the great powers, with consequent dangers to the
preservation of the non-aligned policies, then our
Movement must develop concrete and effective mechanisms
for solving the problems of security and survival that
bedevil so many of our members.
What kinds of "mechanisms" Mr. Rogers had in mind were never
clearly identified, nor did his comments seem to solicit
any suggestions towards developing any. The closing com-
ments of Mr. Rogers' address reiterated support of the
typical Non-Aligned positions. These included support of
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua, support of the Bishop govern-
ment in Grenada, the recognition of SWAPO as the legitimate
governmental spokesman for Namibia, and the recognition of
the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and its chair-
man, Yassar Arafat, as the legitimate spokesman for the
1 6
Palestinian people and their right to a homeland.
Since Belize's participation in the 1983 summit, its
Third World type rhetoric has been curtailed somewhat.
Rather than reflecting any real change in the PUP Govern-
ment's philosophy and ideology, it seems more a matter of
increasing U.S. influence. The cooling of Belize's interac-
tions with Cuba has been specifically attributed to this.
Whether or not Belize continues to participate in the
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Non-Aligned Movement and to identify with its ideas remains
to be seen, especially in view of the recent change in the
Belize Government. The UDP Government has indicated that it
will remain a member of the Non-Aligned Movement, but that
it will definitely favor a pro-Western stance on foreign
1 o
policy issues. ° Regardless, Belize's early participation
seemed to have served its interest well by giving Belize a
large international audience in which to proclaim its quest
for independence—an audience that reflected its support




One of the areas where Belize first began its diplo-
matic initiative to win international support was the
Caribbean. Belize shares a common colonial heritage with
many of the Caribbean island nations but most notably with
the former British colonies like itself, or the Commonwealth
Caribbean countries as they are more commonly known. These
countries established a free trade association in the 1960s
which Belize joined in 1971. It later evolved into the
Caribbean Community and Common Market (CARICOM) in 1974.
One of the early goals of CARICOM was to attempt to coordi-
nate the foreign policies of its member states. Article
seventeen of the CARICOM treaty created a standing committee
of ministers responsible for foreign affairs. It further
stated the intention to bring about "the fullest possible
coordination of their foreign policies within their respec-
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tive competencies and adapting as far as possible common
positions in major international issues." 19 At its incep-
tion, CARICOM's membership was limited to the then four
independent Commonwealth Caribbean nations, but, observer
status was also afforded to the other British colonies prior
to their own independence and resultant Commonwealth
membership.
CARICOM's efforts to carry out the intent of article
seventeen's foreign policy coordination goal proved to be
one of its more difficult task. However, one of the few
foreign policy issues in which CARICOM consensus has been
unanimous, has been support for Belize in its dispute with
Guatemala. In 1974, the Heads of Government of CARICOM
countries met in Guyana. Among their many actions was the
passing of a resolution supporting the independence of
Belize. One primary advantage of the strong showing of
support that the CARICOM countries provided was their
additional support and unanimous voice at other interna-
tional forums, in particular, the Commonwealth of Nations,
the United Nations and the Organization of American States
( OAS )
.
The CARICOM Heads of Government met again in 1976 and
echoed their support for Belize, however, it was not until a
1977 meeting of the OAS in St. Georges, Grenada that the
CARICOM voice received international notice. By 1977,
CARICOM's membership included Grenada and during the OAS
meeting, Grenada joined with Jamaica, Barbados, Panama and
Trinidad-Tobago in issuing a joint communique in support of
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Belize's independence. The communique received solid sup-
port from all of the CARICOM countries as well as Panama and
Surinam. In contrast, Guatemala, which obviously opposed
the communique did not have any overt backing when it spoke
in opposition. This was cited as a tremendous loss of face
for Guatemala and a real breakthrough in gaining Latin
American support for Belize.
The Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee
also held a meeting in 1977 which included representatives
from many of the CARICOM countries. Belize was a partici-
pant in these discussions and it took the opportunity in
1977 to offer to host the meeting for 1978. Belize's offer
was accepted and in May 1978 it entertained representatives
from throughout the Caribbean and Central America. Belize
also used this opportunity to continue its diplomatic ini-
tiative to gain and maintain international support for its
cause. It did so effectively in that a statement was issued
by the Committee—one gathered primarily to discuss economic
cooperation—endorsing Belize's call for a secure
independence.
The CARICOM standing committee of ministers respon-
sible for foreign affairs had maintained a very ineffectual
existence up through the 1970s. They met at their creation
in 1973, again in 1976 and twice in 1979. None of these
meetings "achieved very much beyond the enunciation of vague
statements of general principle." 21 An exception to this,
however, was its steadfast and solid support for Belize. At
the close of the decade the CARICOM countries did resolve to
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improve their procedures of operation for addressing foreign
affairs issues and for reaching greater integration.
In March 1980, the fifth meeting of CARICOM Foreign
Ministers was held in St. Lucia. Their renewed spirit of
cooperation still did not yield any substantial change in
their modus operandi but their support for Belize was un-
bending. They "resolved to continue their efforts to sup-
port the Government and people of Belize in their struggle




One area of contention among the CARICOM Foreign Min-
isters was the shifting political focus of Grenada. The
socialist government headed by Maurice Bishop which took
power in 1979 appeared to them to be forging ties with Cuba.
The United States was not at all pleased with this change of
events and it was quietly using its diplomatic pressure to
persuade Grenada's sister countries to ostracize her. In
particular, the United States was fairly successful in per-
suading the Caribbean countries not to participate in
Grenada's March 1981 celebrations commemorating the second
anniversary of its revolution. Belize was one of only five
Caribbean nations that was not successfully persuaded and
went anyway.
During this same month, Belmopan, Belize was the site
of a CARICOM Foreign Ministers meeting. It was an extraor-
dinary session that met 17-18 March as the result of the
11 March 1981 signing of the Heads of Agreement. The par-
ticipating CARICOM Foreign Ministers issued a declaration
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known as the Declaration of Belmopan. The participants
included representatives from Barbados, Belize, Grenada,
Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia and Trinidad-
Tobago. Their declaration offered full support to the on-
going negotiations and the Heads of Agreement. It also
condemned any form of pressure which sought to make Belize
compromise its sovereignty or violate its territorial integ-
rity. The Foreign Ministers* declaration also went further
than previous declarations of support by resolving to take
"any action necessary" to defend the rights and interest of
2 3Belize. As to what "any action necessary" may have meant
was never well defined, yet it clearly offered one of the
strongest statements of support that Belize had received
thus far.
At the time of the Declaration of Belmopan, Belize's
independence seemed imminent. The United Kingdom had al-
ready committed itself to insure an independent Belize by
the close of 1981. The ongoing Anglo-Guatemalan negotia-
tions also looked more promising than they had ever looked
before. It was an optimistic time for Belize and its sister
Commonwealth Caribbean countries. They could all jointly
take pride in having provided the diplomatic support that
had brought Belize to the threshold of independence. The
Belizean Ambassador to CARICOM, Said Musa, acknowledged the
contributions of Belize's Caribbean neighbors in an address
made in July 1981. He stated:
Belize is a proud member of CARICOM. And it must never
be forgotten that the countries of the Caribbean have
been the frontline States who have waged an intense
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diplomatic offensive on our behalf to help us to win
our freedom and independence.
Belize has continued to be involved in CARICOM and all
of its integration goals. Likewise, CARICOM has continued
to act as a spokesman for the Belizean cause because,
Belizean independence did not come complete with Belizean
freedom. The optimism expressed with the Heads of Agreement
and the Declaration of Belmopan was thwarted when Guatemala
renewed its territorial claim. Consequently, the Caribbean
countries have continued to stand by Belize and to focus on
the persisting issue of Guatemala's threat to its territo-
rial integrity. At a CARICOM Council of Ministers meeting
in January 1982 at Guyana and Foreign Ministers' meetings in
March and April of 1982 in Belize, discussions of the Belize
issue remained an agenda item and strong support favoring
2 5Belize remained intact.
A November 1982 gathering of the CARICOM Heads of
Government in Ocho Rios, Jamaica marked their first meeting
since 1976. The membership ranks had expanded to twelve
countries since then and the roster included, Antigua-
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Guyana,
Jamaica, St. Kitts-Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the
Grenadines, and Trinidad-Tobago. The island country of
Montserrat also participated. The primary agenda item in
1982 was the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI), yet, the
lingering issue of Guatemala's territorial claim to Belize
still retained attention. The Ocho Rios Declaration ad-
dressed the issue of border disputes and reaffirmed support
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for the territorial integrity of Belize. 26 It also stipu-
lated that "efforts should be intensified bilaterally and
unilaterally to guarantee the security of Belize." 27 With
regards to Belize's security, concern was expressed about
its dependence on the British forces but there was "little
enthusiasm for the establishment of a regional or Caribbean
security force ..." to replace them. °
During 1982, Belize also participated in other
Caribbean forums and activities where it took the opportu-
nity to continue to press its diplomatic initiative to keep
the Belize issue alive. Deputy Prime Minister Carl Rogers
attended June meetings of the Caribbean Group for Coopera-
tion in Economic Development in Washington, D. C. and the
Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee in New York
City. Belize also participated in the Central American and
Caribbean Games held during August in Cuba.
Belize's active participation in Caribbean nations'
activities as well as those of other international groupings
served very well to establish and affirm its status and
recognition as a sovereign, independent state. As this
happened it only further alienated Guatemala with its terri-
torial claim to Belizean land.
The ten year anniversary of CARICOM was marked by
another Heads of Government meeting in Trinidad-Tobago dur-
ing July 1983. Economic development was once again the
primary agenda item, but true to form, the conference also
issued a communique offering support to Belize and the
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. Only
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three months later, an emergency meeting of the Heads of
Government was held in Trinidad-Tobago to discuss the mili-
tary coup which had unseated Prime Minister Maurice Bishop
in Grenada. The members were split over an appropriate
action. Some of them sought military action and others did
not. Belize was one of four countries that did not. A
statement from its government indicated: "Our government
remains firmly committed to the principles of noninterven-
tion in the internal affairs of other states, the non-use of
force and respect for the right to self-determination. ^
Whereas Belize stood among the minority of CARICOM countries
and in clear opposition to U. S. policies, its non-interven-
tionist stance simply reflected its own ideals and long-term
aspirations in its own troubles with Guatemala. Belize also
had the backing of its big brothers, Canada and the United
Kingdom, in opposing the military actions in Grenada.
It was unfortunate that the foreign policy consensus
that CARICOM had hoped to achieve among its member states
was not prevalent when the Grenada incident took place.
However, the split it caused did not prove to be overly
divisive. A CARICOM Summit of Heads of Government was held
in July 1984 in Nassau with the expressed intent to "patch
up the differences" and "to consolidate and strengthen the
bonds which have historically existed among the people of
the Commonwealth Caribbean." 30 Surprisingly, Grenada per-se
did not come up as an issue at the summit but rather a
discussion on the "broader view of the security of small
states which continue to be seriously threatened." In this

66
context, the Belize issue arose and once again the Heads of
Government called on the international community "to main-
tain its support for Belize in its effort to secure an early
and peaceful resolution of the problems ..." with which
it is confronted.
Clearly, the Commonwealth Caribbean countries have
been some of most steadfast supporters of Belize. Although
their geographic size and their numbers are few, their
persistent pleas on behalf of Belize contributed signifi-
cantly in bringing the Belize issue to the forefront of
international attention. One of the international forums in
which the CARICOM countries spoke very effectively was in
the larger Commonwealth of Nations.
Commonwealth of Nations
When Belize gained the attention of the Commonwealth
of Nations at their 1975 Summit in Kingston, Jamaica, it was
felt that it had finally fully internationalized the Belize-
Guatemala issue. The Jamaica Summit had representatives
from thirty-three countries that represented one quarter of
the world population and almost one fourth of the U. N.
membership. In addition, the countries there represented
every race, every climatic region of the globe and very
diverse social and political backgrounds. "Never before had
the Belize problem been aired at such an exalted diplomatic
level." 34
Although Belize had gained some attention in pre-1975
meetings of the Non-Aligned countries and the CARICOM coun-

67
tries, the meetings of these groups simply had not held the
prestige or gained the attention of a world audience. How-
ever, many of Belize's supporters in these other organiza-
tions were also some of the more influential members of the
Commonwealth of Nations. These countries included India and
Tanzania which shared membership in the Non-Aligned Movement
and Jamaica which shared membership in CARICOM. It was
perhaps Jamaica, the host of the 1975 Summit, that offered
the most significant support for Belize. It was able to
line up sufficient backers to have the Belize issue "brought
fairly and squarely as a central issue of the Conference." 35
The discussions concerning Belize were initiated by
the Barbados participants who had previously been delegated
that responsibility by the membership of the CARICOM caucus.
It was a consensus opinion that Britain's negotiations with
Guatemala to resolve the Belize issue had been prolonged far
too long. Although continuous negotiating efforts had taken
place, the actual negotiations were very intermittent and
had in fact been occurring for over 116 years. Clearly,
Britain had been "dragging her feet." 36 The conference urged
the United Kingdom to have its diplomats conduct the Anglo-
Guatemalan negotiations with a new sense of urgency. Some
members also felt that Britain should be willing to provide
security guarantees for an independent Belize. Others felt
this might be a more appropriate role for the Commonwealth
T 7
or the United Nations.
As the Belize issue was discussed, the African
Commonwealth countries were inclined to give their over-
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whelming support. They saw in the plight of Belize a strug-
gle similar to their own and those of fellow African coun-
tries. The African origin of many Belizean citizens was
also a common bond for unifying African support of Belize. 38
The final communique of the Jamaica Summit gave "full
support for the aspirations of the people of Belize for
early independence." 39 It was endorsed unanimously by all of
the participating Commonwealth countries. The Belizean
Government hailed "this commitment by Commonwealth brothers"
as the "greatest diplomatic breakthrough so far ..." in
its struggle with Guatemala. ° Premier George Price was
said to have "scored a homer on the ballfield of interna-
tional politics as he made a smash-hit for Belize's
case . . . . 1 He was also credited with having, "cata-
pulted the Belize situation into the focus of world leaders
concerned with the liberation struggles of the oppressed
peoples of the Third World." 42
In participating at the Jamaican Summit, the Belizean
delegation, headed by Premier Price, had three main objec-
tives: to muster political support for Belizean indepen-
dence; to prod the British Government to bring about inde-
pendence as soon as possible; and to internationalize
Belize's problems within the Commonwealth forum. j All of
these objectives were either met or addressed very posi-
tively. Some highly desireable consequences of the suc-
cessful achievement of these objectives were also realized.
Belize acquired many new committed friends who were, "ready,
able and strategically placed to exploit opportunities for
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advancing Belizean national interest." 44 More importantly,
the Commonwealth of Nations was an influential group whose
members shared participation in the United Nations. It was
felt "inevitable that the impact of the Commonwealth Summit
on the United Nations . . . will bring force to bear on
those powers which continue to practice the politics of
colonialism and oppression."
Although the voice of support given by the Common-
wealth of Nations in 1975 was a major success for Belize, it
was only a minor hurdle in Belize's long struggle towards
independence. Two years later when the Commonwealth Heads
of Government met once again, they voiced similar support
for Belize's independence. They did however, go one step
further by establishing a Ministerial Committee among member
countries to "render all practicable assistance" to Belize
in its fight for independence. The committee did not have
any real power, except in the individual and collective
diplomatic expertise and influence of its members which
included, Barbados, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, India,
Malaysia, Nigeria and Tanzania. Canada's participation
proved to be very beneficial for Belize in that it nurtured
a friendly relationship that continues to serve Belize well
with large amounts of Canadian financial assistance as well
as diplomatic support.
Although the Commonwealth of Nations also met in 1979,
any significance that summit may have played for Belize was
overshadowed by the remarkable success that Belize enjoyed
at the United Nations. In a vote by the U. N. General

7Assembly for Belizean independence, Belize received unani-
mous support from all of the Commonwealth countries as well
as all of the member states of the Non-Aligned Movement.
The 1981 Summit of the Commonwealth of Nations in
Melbourne, Australia, occurred just after Belize's September
independence. Belize submitted an early bid for membership
however, and it was approved effective Independence Day.
Consequently, on 21 September 1981, Belize became the
forty-fifth full member of the Commonwealth of Nations.
Representatives from twenty-six of Belize's fellow Commonwealth
countries shared in its Independence Day festivities. 48 In a
statement prepared for the newest sovereign state to join
her Commonwealth, Her Majesty, Queen Elizabeth II commented:
Today marks the opening of a new chapter in the long
and close relationship between Britain and Belize.
Successive stages of constitutional advance resulted in
the assumption by Belize of responsibility for its own
internal affairs. With independence your leaders now
assume full responsibilities for the Government of the
new Independent State of Belize, including its
relations with other countries . . . they will continue
to have the full support of the Government and people
of Britain, of countries of the Commonwealth and of theJo i
international community as a who;
At the Melbourne Summit, the Commonwealth Heads of Govern-
ment adjusted their past statements of support for Belizean
independence and instead emphasized and reaffirmed their
full support for the new Government of Belize to maintain
its territorial integrity in view of the continuing
SOGuatemalan claim.
The most recent summit of the Commonwealth Heads of
Government occurred in New Delhi, India in November 1983. A
Belizean editorial prior to the conference stated that
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Belize would seek a "wider Commonwealth commitment in order
to assure the British Government that pending a settlement
with Guatemala ..." the British would not be "alone in
their defence of Belize against Guatemala's threat to its
sovereignty and territorial integrity.
"
51
The summit itself involved forty-four of the forty-
eight member states. Although the countries continued to
provide solid backing for Belize, there was no indication of
willingness to relieve Britain of its security arrangements
with Belize. Rather, the final communique of the conference
"noted with concern the continuation of the political prob-
lem between Belize and Guatemala . . . , reaffirmed full
support for the efforts of the Government of Belize to
maintain Belize's territorial integrity ..." and ex-
pressed satisfaction with "the continuing role of the
British Government in helping to provide for the security of
Belize." In 1984, Belize continued to participate in
Commonwealth forums, such as the September meetings of the
Commonwealth Parliamentary Association in London and the
Commonwealth Finance Ministers in Toronto.
Belize's membership in the Commonwealth of Nations and
its sub-organizations have helped greatly to legitimize its
stature as an independent and sovereign nation. It has also
seemed to stimulate an increase in Belize's receipt of
foreign aid. Participation in annual meetings of Common-
wealth Finance Ministers has helped Belize to identify its
economic needs to those who could provide the help needed.
The Commonwealth Development Corporation was especially
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generous in providing loans for Belize's agricultural devel-
opment. 53 In 1983 alone, it provided almost $13 million for
citrus and sugarcane production. Among the Commonwealth
countries other than Britain, Canada has been especially
generous to Belize. Much of the budget for the Belizean
Government is in fact provided by loans from Britain, the
United States, the European Economic Community (EEC), and
Canada. 5
Canada and Belize have enjoyed warm relations since at
least the mid-1960s. Although Canadian aid to the Common-
wealth Caribbean organizations has been extended to Belize
for years, it has only been since Belize's independence that
Belize has benefitted significantly from the generosity of
the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).
During the Belizean Independence Day festivities, a number
of visiting journalists commented on the open sewers of
Belize City. CIDA sought to rectify this truthful observa-
tion by a $60 million joint water and sewerage project for
Belize City. Canada's share of this project was a $42
million grant and a loan for almost $16 million. At that
time, it was the single largest bilateral economic Coopera-
te c
tion project that had ever benefitted Belize. The Belize
City project began in 1982 and it is still underway. In
addition, CIDA has since expressed its willingness to con-
tinue to assist Belize in other water projects. 6
With regard to military assistance, the Canadian
Government has provided training to members of the Belizean
Defense Force (BDF). In a related area, Canada and Belize
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joined ranks in opposing the 1983 military intervention in
Grenada. They have indeed shared a harmonious relationship
that has proven to be most advantageous for Belize. Only as
recently as April 1984, did Belize fully acknowledge the
scope of its Canadian relationship through the upgrading of
its diplomatic relations with that country with the appoint-
ment of a High Commissioner to Canada.
Canadian support as well as that of the entire Common-
wealth membership has without a doubt contributed signifi-
cantly to Belize. A comment made by the Belize Secretary of
State, Vernon Courtenay, following his participation in the
1981 Melbourne Summit provides an appropriate summation of
the Belize perspective. He said the significance of the
support given by the Commonwealth countries was their abili-
ty to "work up massive world support, morally and physi-
cally, through the tremendous influence they exercise in
worldwide organizations." 58 Undoubtedly, the primary
worldwide organization in which Belize solicited support was
the United Nations.
United Nations
Belize created a formal mission at the United Nations
in 1975, but its diplomatic efforts to wield influence among
its member states and its own participation started much
earlier. In 1967, amidst ongoing mediation efforts by the
United States in the Anglo-Guatemalan negotiations, the
leader of the Belizean Opposition made an appearance before
the U. N. De-Colonization Committee, or the Fourth Committee
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as it is more commonly referred. The Opposition leader was
seeking United Nations' assistance in obtaining independence
for Belize. His appearance was thought premature by the PUP
Government, so the Minister of Internal Affairs, Carl Rogers
also appeared before the Fourth Committee to state that any
intervention by the United Nations at that time would have
been very inappropriate due to the mediation efforts that
were in progress. * In his address, Mr. Rogers did cite "the
World Body as Belize's last best hope" and he made it clear
that Belize would be back asking for assistance from the
U. N. if it ever became necessary or helpful to its cause.
Another event during 1967 caused the Belizean Govern-
ment to realize that if it ever did need to rely on its
"last best hope" that Belize would have to do its homework
and prepare its case before it ever approached the U. N. for
support of independence. The 1967 event was "the impulsive
attempt by the leaders of Gibraltar ... to force a vote in
the United Nations on their dispute with Spain over their
rights of self determination." 61 Gibraltar had not done so
much as to line up the support of its own Commonwealth
brethren beforehand, and much to its surprise, they were
split on the vote with the majority favoring Spain. Spain
had achieved its success through a carefully waged
propaganda campaign.
In witnessing this premature attempt by Gibraltar,
Belize learned a valuable lesson in how to exercise "astute
diplomatic caution." 62 Consequently, and as previously pre-
sented, Belize focused its earliest diplomatic initiatives
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amongst smaller international bodies that could in turn echo
their support at the United Nations. It was only after the
success of the 1975 Commonwealth of Nations Summit in
Jamaica that Belize felt prepared to begin pressing for an
independence resolution from the U. N. Fourth Committee.
Belize's diplomatic successes thus far had given it an
"absolute guarantee against the type of diplomatic disaster
which befell . . . Gibraltar." 63 Belize had the unanimous
support of the Commonwealth and many Third World friends who
were "well briefed and . . . convinced of the justice and




In December of 1974, prior to the Jamaican Common-
wealth Summit, Deputy Premier Carl Rogers did appear before
the U. N. Fourth Committee. This appearance was primarily
an opportunity for Belize to present and update its case,
and to perform some early solicitation for new supporters.
No resolutions were proposed and no votes were taken.
Premier George Price delivered his 1975 State of the
Nation address in September. The speech included his state-
ment of intent to establish a permanent mission at the
United Nations. This was carried out within weeks of his
announcement. The new U. N. delegates began an immediate
and intense lobbying effort to present the Belize case and
to gain new supporters. They met with reasonable success
undoubtedly due largely to the popularity of anti-
colonialism issues at the U. N. On 21 November 1975,
Trinidad-Tobago presented a resolution cosponsored by
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sixty-three other countries to the U. N. Fourth Committee
calling for Belize's independence and recognition of its
rights to self-determination, sovereignty and territorial
integrity. This very first U. N. resolution was adopted in
committee by a vote of 103 countries in favor, 12 countries
opposed and 13 countries abstaining. Although this initial
success was encouraging, Cuba was the only Latin American
country that supported the resolution.
With this success in committee, the Belize delegation
intensified its lobbying efforts to gain additional support
for a vote in the General Assembly. On 8 December 1975, it
met with similar success. Votes of support were provided by
110 countries, with 9 countries opposing, 16 countries ab-
staining and 8 countries not voting. Guatemala was one of
those that did not vote. It walked out in protest during
the vote—a practice which it would make standard in all
later U. N. votes on Belize. The no votes and abstentions
were dominated by Belize's Latin American neighbors, with
its closest Central American neighbors providing a solid
bloc in support of Guatemala.
Regardless, Belize had clearly won a resounding vic-
tory. The wisdom of its patient diplomatic initiative
through the 1960s and early 1970s had met with great suc-
cess. After Belize's first U. N. votes, Deputy Premier
Rogers stated:
It is my distinct impression after witnessing the
support of the member states of the United Nations to
Belize in its quest for freedom and independence that
those countries were prepared to follow the Belize




Premier George Price was very uplifted by the initial
U. N. success and in an inspiring speech to the General
Assembly he pleaded:
Let Belize live, let her maintain her territory intact,
and let her be sovereign and independent, able to con-
tribute to the development of the world as a full member
of the U. N. 66
In 1976, one of the primary objectives of the Belize
U. N. mission was to try to make a dent in the Latin
American bloc that thus far had stood firmly by Guatemala.
It achieved some moderate success. Peru and Venezuela, who
had previously abstained from voting, offered Belize encour-
agement and support. Peru in particular, under its own very
nationalistic government and as a participant in the Non-
Aligned Movement, was inclined to support Belize. However,
beyond verbal support neither of these countries changed
their position of abstaining in the formal voting. Paraguay
had voted a resounding no on the 1975 resolutions but it
changed its position to an abstention in 1976. Panama was
the one true convert and the first significant crack in the
Latin American bloc. During this time Panama did have a
very nationalistic leader in General Torrijos, who was ac-
tively engaged in fighting his own form of anti-colonialism
in the Panama Canal negotiations with the United States.
This undoubtedly influenced the complete change in Panama's
position. After having voted against the 1975 resolutions,
in 1976 Panama became an open advocate and spokesman for
Belizean independence. The head of Belize's U. N. mission,
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Assad Shoman, commented that with Panama's vote of support,
the "Latin American solidarity on which Guatemala has relied
for so long, is very obviously cracking." 67 The total vote
tally for the 1976 General Assembly resolution included 115
votes in support, 8 votes in opposition and 15 abstentions.
The pendulum was slowly swinging further in Belize's favor.
With Panama having fissured the Latin American bloc in
1976, the emphasis of 1977 was to make the crack even larg-
er. Unwittingly, Guatemala helped to do this. While peace-
ful negotiations were underway in Washington, D. C. among
Belizean, British and Guatemalan negotiators, Guatemala was
positioning its army along the Belize border. Belize feared
an imminent invasion and requested British reinforcements to
supplement a small defensive garrison.
In August of 1977, in response to Guatemala's bellig-
erence, the heads of government of Colombia, Costa Rica,
Jamaica, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela met in Bogota,
Colombia, to discuss Belize with respect to the previous
actions of the United Nations. This meeting was significant
because it was conducted without the auspices of any offi-
cial international organization and it acquired the partici-
pation of countries that previously had favored Guatemala.
The Bogota meeting produced a declaration of support for
Belize that was later to translate into new votes of support
in the U. N. 68
Premier George Price represented Belize before the




There is no way to reverse the march of history and the
principles established by the United Nations in its
long, heroic and honourable struggle against colonial-
ism. Resolution 1514 proclaims the inalienable right of
colonized peoples to self-determination. This right
cannot be subject to a veto, either by the colonial
power or by the claimant state. ^
His comments were clearly aimed at Guatemala in order to
make it obvious to the United Nations that it was in
violation of basic U. N. principles.
The resolution of 1977 was largely a repeat of the
previous two years' resolutions but it reflected a new sense
of urgency to the situation in light of Guatemala's military
70threats. In his address, Premier Price also outlined the
many attempts that both Belize and Britain had made to
settle the longstanding dispute with Guatemala. He also
reiterated the fact that while Guatemala was supposedly
working to negotiate a peaceful solution, it was also posed
for war.
The Fourth Committee vote on the 1977 resolution re-
sulted in 115 votes of support, only 5 votes of opposition
and 16 countries still continuing to abstain. Mexico and
Venezuela finally shifted to favorable endorsement of the
resolution and several other Latin American countries
shifted from no votes to abstentions. Uruguay was one of
these.
Increasing Latin American support was even more forth-
coming in the 1977 vote of the General Assembly. The reso-
lution calling for Belizean independence, self-
determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity was
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supported by a record 126 countries. This group included
Panama, Mexico, Venezuela, Peru and Argentina. Latin
American bloc support for Guatemala had clearly disinte-
grated. Only four countries opposed the Belize resolution
and these were Guatemala's loyal Central American neighbors
of Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Costa Rica. 71 Costa
Rica's vote was primarily one reflecting solidarity with its
Central American brothers rather than any real opposition to
an independent Belize. The total number of countries that
continued to abstain was thirteen. Momentum was indeed in
favor of Belize.
On 9 December 1977, following the approval of the
U. N. resolutions, the Foreign Ministers of a group of
Caribbean and Latin American countries met in Kingston,
Jamaica to further discuss the Belize issue. Representa-
tives of Barbados, Grenada, Jamaica, Guyana, Panama, Surinam
and Venezuela, and observers from Mexico and Belize partici-
pated. They issued a document known as the Kingston Decla-
ration which reaffirmed their continued support for the past
resolutions of the United Nations, the Commonwealth of
Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement. The declaration it-
self basically repeated the language of these past resolu-
tions but its importance was in serving to keep the Belize
issue near the forefront of international political
opinion. 72 Premier Price's 1978 State of the Nation speech
included praise for countries such as these for their ef-




We continue to win more respect and support from the
United Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and other
international bodies. We pay tribute to our fellow
members of the Caribbean Community, ... to Panama and
Mexico, who are nearest to our problems, and whose
courage in supporting the rights of our people sustain
us in our strength.
Upon the commencement of the thirty-third plenary
session of the U. N. General Assembly, the Commonwealth
Ministerial Committee that had been formed at the 1977
Commonwealth Summit, met "to help Belize and Britain find
early and effective arrangements for the independence of
Belize." They also acknowledged that any land concession
by Belize was not an acceptable means of settling the Anglo-
Guatemalan dispute. In addition, a great many of Belize's
friends spoke out individually during the general debate.
The Jamaican foreign minister called for speedy imple-
mentation of the United Nations' Belize resolutions. He
also deplored the external pressures and threats to which
Belize had been subjected and which constituted the princi-
7 Spie obstacle to its early accession to independence.
The Cuban foreign minister called for an end to colo-
nialism and he urged that the rights of self-determination
and independence be respected. He also said: "Cuba energet-
ically supports the people of Belize whose territorial inte-
grity is threatened by the proimperialist regime of
Guatemala, . . ." 76
Mexico's foreign minister spoke out in strong support
of the past U. N. resolutions regarding Belize. He stated
that they were "the best legal basis for any solution to the
Anglo-Guatemalan dispute." 77 He further stated that his
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country would "continue to participate in any consultations
guided by the principles and purposes of the United Nations,
and of good neighbourliness and brotherhood that link Mexico
and Guatemala." 78
The foreign minister from Trinidad-Tobago "reaffirmed
his government's support for Belizean self-determination and
independence in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations, and recognition of Belize's territorial integ-
rity." 79 He also told the General Assembly that his
Government was concerned over pressures on Belize to cede
any part of its territory as the price of its independence.
The issue of Belize being under pressure to cede land
was brought up by so many of its supporters during 1978
because not only was Guatemala insisting that Belize do so,
but the British negotiators had also suggested it during
some early negotiations in 1978. Belize's adamant refusal
to even consider this was clearly put forth during those
negotiations and in Deputy Premier Rogers' address to the
U. N. Fourth Committee in 1978. He maintained that "terri-
torial integrity for Belize was an absolute non-negotiable
principle in seeking a just settlement." He also urged
support for an updated resolution which separated the issue
of independence for Belize from the outcome of any negotia-
tions between Britain and Guatemala. This change simply
reflected the Memorandum of Understanding that the Belizean
Government and Opposition had signed with Britain in July of
1978. One other change in Deputy Premier Rogers' appearance
before the Fourth Committee in 1978 was that he was joined
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for the first time by a delegation that included members of
both Belize's Government and Opposition. The Opposition's
members included Manuel Esquivel, the current Prime Minister
of Belize, but he was then only a political newcomer.
The Fourth Committee vote on the new Belize resolution
was favorable. With Panama cosponsoring the resolution, it
passed with 118 votes in favor, 4 votes against and 12
abstentions. The General Assembly vote which soon followed
on 6 December 1978 was a resounding victory. For the very
first time, the Belize independence resolution faced no
votes of opposition.
Before the vote was taken, the Guatemalan representa-
tive addressed the General Assembly. "He said that the
United Nations had placed more emphasis on the right to
independence for a colonial territory than the territorial
ft lintegrity of a sovereign member state." His comments seemed
to have anticipated the outcome he foresaw in the U. N.
votes. Belize received the unanimous support of the Common-
wealth of Nations, the unanimous support of the Non-Aligned
Movement, and an overwhelming majority of support from the
member states of the OAS. One of Belize's new supporters
was Costa Rica. The vote itself was 128 in favor, opposed
and 12 abstentions. The abstainers still included the
United States. However, it was thought that neither it nor
any of the other "uncommitted" countries could continue to
remain uncommitted over Belize in view of the consistent
U. N. resolutions calling for Belizean independence.
Because of Belize's victory at the United Nations in
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1978, the year 1979 was one initially marked by renewed
dedication to negotiations among Guatemala, Britain and
Belize. At one point, the vice-president of Guatemala
stated that Britain and Guatemala had finally resolved their
dispute over Belize through an agreement that called for the
cession of land by Belize. His comments were quickly dis-
puted by other Guatemalan Government officials as well as
the Government of Britain. No settlement had been reached
and even if one had, had it required the cession of land, it
Q o
would never have been approved by Belize.
The U. N. votes in 1979 were similar to 1978 except
that in the Fourth Committee as well as in the General
Assembly there were not any votes of opposition. The list
of abstainers had also dwindled to seven.
One significant new vote of support was that of
Nicaragua. Since the previous U. N. vote, the Sandinista
Revolution had succeeded in ousting the Somoza Regime and
the Sandinistas had come out firmly in support of Belize.
They did in fact cosponsor the Belize resolution in the
Fourth Committee. 8 "* El Salvador also shifted its vote of
support to the Belize resolutions. 4 Guatemala was very
quickly becoming totally isolated with its intransigent
attitude towards Belize.
In early 1980, the Belizean magazine, Brukdown ,
interviewed Rafael Castillo Valdez, the Guatemalan Foreign
Minister. He was asked how he accounted for Guatemala's
loss of support in the United Nations by other Latin
American countries. He denied that Guatemala had lost any
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support. He stated: "In matters that are the vital concern
of the Guatemalan people we have the support and respect of
those people. That is what is important to us." 85 He was
also asked why it appeared that Guatemala stood alone among
the nations of the world in its attitude towards Belize.
He stated that he disagreed that Guatemala stood alone.
Mr. Valdez clearly did not want to face the obvious answers
to these questions.
In 1980, Belize sought once again to present its case
to the United Nations. Although each one of the previous
four years 1 resolutions had been approved, they had yet to
prompt a final settlement of the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute.
In accordance with the resolutions, negotiations had been
conducted. They had been conducted at many different diplo-
matic levels and in many different places but no workable
agreement had yet proven acceptable to all of the parties.
Despite the thus far seemingly insignificant results
of U. N. resolutions for independence, Belize was persistent
in continuing to use the U. N. General Assembly. There was
one country in particular that Belize had yet to draw into
the Belizean court and its lack of support for Belize was
still seen as a very positive factor for Guatemala.
The United States had consistently abstained from
voting on the U. N. Belize resolutions. Although President
Jimmy Carter voiced support for the cause of the Belizean
people in 1978, the United States' U. N. delegation had
remained noncommittal through the 1970s. It did appear in
early 1980, however, that the United States was finally
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going to vote in favor of Belizean independence during the
thirty-fifth plenary session of the United Nations. Conse-
quently, Belize was optimistic as it prepared to fight one
more round at the United Nations.
As expected, the United States did finally vote for
the Belize resolution in the U. N. Fourth Committee. Upon
doing so the U. S. representative issued a press release
which stated:
My Government favors the principle of self determination
embodied in this resolution and those of previous years.
Our abstention in the past was for the purpose of en-
couraging a negotiated solution, and did not relate to
the merits of the dispute. We are now convinced that
Belizean independence should not be delayed. We have
therefore voted in favor of the resolution. 86
The total vote in the Fourth Committee resulted in 130
in favor, 1 against and 8 abstentions. In the General
Assembly, 139 countries voted in favor, none voted against
o 7
and 7 still abstained. The resolution in 1980 was basical-
ly a repeat draft of previous resolutions, however, it did
have a few significant differences. Part of the resolution
declared that, "Belize should become an independent State
before the conclusion of the thirty-sixth session of the
General Assembly." This aspect of the resolution gave the
attainment of independence a very definite timetable. With
Britain having endorsed the resolution, as it had all the
others, it committed itself to grant Belize its independence
before the end of 1981, in spite of no settlement of the
Anglo-Guatemalan dispute. It also called on Britain to
convene a constitutional conference and to continue to pro-
vide security for the territorial integrity of Belize.
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One of the repeat provisions of the resolution was for
the continuance of negotiations to reach a peaceful settle-
ment of the territorial dispute. These negotiations were
pursued earnestly in early 1981 in hopes of Belize being
able to achieve independence in a state of peace and good-
will with its Guatemalan neighbors. Although there was some
early hope of this achievement after the March 1981 Heads of
Agreement, these hopes were quickly shattered when Guatemala
continued to press for the cession of land. Despite the
lack of a final settlement, Belize was able to celebrate its
first Independence Day in 1981 as the British had promised.
On 25 September 1981, only four days after its
independence, Belize was admitted as the 156th member of
the United Nations, just in time to participate in the
thirty-sixth plenary session of the General Assembly. The
President of the United Nations offered encouragement and a
warm welcome to the U. N.'s newest member. He stated:
In welcoming the delegation of Belize to our midst, I
know that I am expressing the sentiments of this Assem-
bly when I say that it is my sincere hope that out-
standing problems will soon be resolved in a spirit of
peaceful cooperation, thus strengthening international
peace and security and assuring the people of Belize
future happiness, prosperity and peaceful and friendly
cooperation with all its neighbors.
In his speech before the U. N. General Assembly for the
first time as a member, Prime Minister Price addressed the
unresolved dispute that continued to trouble Belize as it
tried to live in peace. He stated:
There is a threat to this peace because a neighbour to
which we extend the hand of friendship and offer of
economic regional co-operation has not responded yet to
our invitation. Yet, we stand ready to pursue the
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formula for peace agreed upon by the United Kingdom,
Guatemala and Belize in a determined endeavour to
search for a peaceful solution of the dispute between
the United Kingdom and Guatemala, without prejudice to
our sovereignty and territorial integrity. °
Belize's attainment of independence and membership in
the U. N. did not stop the need for it to continue to press
its diplomatic initiative since the Guatemalan territorial
claim and military threat continued to rob Belize of any
real freedom. Belize's focus in the U. N. simply changed
from one of seeking independence, sovereignty and territo-
rial integrity to one of seeking primarily territorial
integrity.
In August of 1982, Belize filed a formal protest with
the U. N. over a violation of its border by Guatemalan
military officers. After outlining the facts of the inci-
dent, the protest note concluded: "We wish to record our
strong protest of the violation of Belizean territory and
request that it be circulated to all members of the U. N.
It was assumed that by bringing incidents such as these to
the attention of the U. N., that Belize could help to fur-
ther castigate and alienate Guatemala in the world's eye.
The thirty-seventh plenary session of the U. N. began
only a few months after this incident and once again Belize
spoke before the General Assembly. Deputy Prime Minister
Carl Rogers delivered the speech which outlined the contin-
uing efforts by Belize and Britain to resolve the age old
dispute with Guatemala. He further reiterated Guatemala's
belligerence in refusing to recognize Belize as an indepen-
dent state or to even negotiate directly with it. In an
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interview with Mr. Rogers after his return from New York, he
was asked about Belize's continued use of international
forums. He stated:
Belize must always be on the alert. Belize must never
lower its guard. We need the support of the nations of
the world to understand our cause because the
Guatemalans have never dropped their guard .... We
must keep our support lined up at all times because . .
when we are talking about recognition we are talking
about the rest of the world recognizing us and
Guatemala not recognizing us. We must keep the rest of
the world on our side.
Mr. Rogers was also asked what would be Belize's next move.
He responded:
Our next move is to participate fully in the U. N. I
went there to explain Belize's position as we see it,
the view of Belizeans; ... we want to be clearly
understood on each issue as they affect us and as we
see them. Belize will have to have a larger delegation
in order to deal with problems that come up at the
U. N. The U. N. is where things happen.
In May of 1983, Prime Minister Price visited U. S.
President Ronald Reagan in Washington, D. C. During this
trip he also went to New York where he met with the U. N.
Secretary General, Javier Parez de Cuellar, as well as the
U. S. Ambassador to the U. N., Jeanne Kirkpatrick. All of
these meetings and discussions were to discuss Belize's
problems and the Guatemalan situation. The diplomatic ini-
tiative that Belize had begun in the early 1960s had clearly
not yet ended.
Belize registered another protest at the U. N. in
June 1983 for another Guatemalan border violation. This
particular violation involved the pursuit of a Guatemalan by
the Guatemalan Army across the Belizean border where the
victim was brutally murdered. Belize filed the "strongest
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possible protest" for a "callous and barbarous act" which
constituted a clear violation of its territory. 94
In his October 1983 speech before the U. N. General
Assembly, Deputy Prime Minister Rogers reminded the world
body of this incident and described it as characteristic of
the Guatemalan regime. His statements referred to
Guatemala's "intransigent attitude" and the persistence of
its position which constituted a continuing threat to one of
the few remaining places in Central America in which there
95was peace. J
Carl Rogers* most recent appearance at the U. N.
occurred during October 1984 when he addressed the thirty-
ninth plenary session of the General Assembly. His remarks
were delivered some time after a speech by Guatemala's
Foreign Minister, Fernando Andrade. During Mr. Andrade's
speech, he told the General Asembly that his Government
along with representatives of the United Kingdom and Belize
would continue to search for "a just and honourable solu-
tion" to their problems, but that his Government still
refused to recognize the independence of Belize.
When Carl Rogers spoke he urged Guatemala to move away
from its "archaic and anachronistic attitudes of the past"
and to "abandon the unreal and unproductive fiction" of
denying Belize independence. 97 He also spoke of Belize's will-
ingness to negotiate with Guatemala in good faith and with
determination to find a solution to their problems, but that
first, Guatemala "must recognize the independence and terri-




In other U. N. actions of 1984, Belize's U. N.
Ambassador, Robert Leslie, voted approval for a slate of
candidates that would represent Latin America and the
Caribbean during the thirty-ninth plenary session. This
slate of candidates included Guatemala for a vice-
presidential position. In voting for the candidates,
Ambassador Leslie filed a reservation which stated:
The decision of my delegation should not be interpreted
as approval of Guatemala's international posture, nor a
comment on its record at the U. N. , nor acceptance of
its persistent nonrecognition of the existence of the
independent state of Belize within our own land and sea
boundaries, nor of its claim to our territory. It
should rather be seen as a sign of our solidarity with
the Latin American group. And it should be interpreted
by the General Assembly and Guatemala as another good
faith contribution of Belize to the dialogue for peace
and cooperation between our two countries and in our
troubled region. y
Although Belize's U. N. participation has been most
notable in the General Assembly and in the Fourth Committee
prior to its independence, Belize has also fully involved
itself in many forums within the auspices of the United
Nations, particularly since its 1981 independence. Much of
this participation has yielded tangible benefits for Belize,
but, it has also served to keep Belize involved with other
countries with which it could continue to press for support
in its diplomatic fight. There are many examples of
Belize's participation in these smaller U. N. forums. One
of these was Belize's attendance at the June 1982 meeting of
the Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee. From
this meeting it was able to obtain financial assistance from
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the U. N. Development Program. During July of 1983 Belize
sent representatives to the meeting of the U. N. World Food
Council. 101 In January 1984, meetings with members of the
U. N. International Children's Fund (UNICEF) resulted in a
four year extension of existing educational assistance pro-
102grams. u Within the past year alone, Belize has sent repre-
sentatives to the U. N. Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) Sugar Conference, a regional meeting of the U. N.
Food and Agricultural Organization, and a meeting of the
U. N. International Conference on Population. 103
Although these few examples are far from being a
complete record of Belize's participation, they clearly
illustrate the fact that the tiny nation of Belize has
become a new international actor. Belize's U. N. record of
participation alone makes this indisputable, but it becomes
even more so when observed in conjunction with its success-
ful participation in CARICOM, the Non-Aligned Movement and
the Commonwealth of Nations.
Other International Organizations and Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America
In addition to its membership in the international
forums previously discussed, Belize also maintained either
membership or association with several other organizations.
One of the first international organizations which Belize
joined was the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA).
Belize was accepted as an associate member in 1961 by a vote
of seventeen to four, but it did not become a very active
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participant. 104 In 1975, at a meeting in Trinidad, Belize did
take advantage of the audience that its membership afforded
it in order to plead its case for independence. Belize's
appearance followed closely after its success at the
Jamaican Summit of the Commonwealth of Nations. In address-
ing the group of Latin American countries, Premier George
Price brought up the Guatemalan issue. He stressed that it
was "not an issue in which might is right." He further
emphasized that the people of Belize were "innocent victims
of an unacceptable claim ... by a neighbouring country."
Although many Latin American countries were perhaps sympa-
thetic to Belize, as a group they were faithful in their
support of the Guatemalan position. It was only among the
recently independent Caribbean members of ECLA that Belize
received backing.
Organization of American States
Belize faced similar reactions in the Organization of
American States (OAS). Belize is not a member of the OAS;
however, it has been a frequent observer at OAS meetings,
and the Belizean-Guatemalan dispute has also been a frequent
agenda item. Guatemala's efforts to use the OAS forum to
renounce British acts of aggression in 1972 backfired when
Premier Price and the Jamaican OAS representative waged a
successful struggle that led to Guatemala's withdrawal of
1 D7its resolution.
At a July 1978 meeting of the OAS in Washington,
D. C, United States President Jimmy Carter delivered the
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opening speech. In this address he drew attention to the
unsettled Belize-Guatemala dispute by referring to the set-
tlement of the Panama Canal issue and indicating that it
"should be a good sign that other disputes in our hemisphere
can also be settled peacefully
. . .
,"
108 He went on to men-
tion the Belize-Guatemala situation specifically.
Another OAS meeting when Belize was highlighted
occurred only weeks after the U. N. victory of 1980. A
group of member states presented a resolution whereby the
OAS would add its endorsement to the successful U. N. reso-
lution that called for Belize's independence. It passed
overwhelmingly and in so doing, delivered a second major
diplomatic defeat to Guatemala in international forums
within a period of less than three weeks. In responding to
the OAS vote, Premier Price stated:
It is now crystal clear that world opinion in favour of
Belize has grown to the extent that the O.A.S. has by
majority vote come out in favour for the independence of
Belize and a rejection of the Guatemala claim ....
Belize has always extended the hand of friendship to
Guatemala. We now ask the people of Guatemala to
support and accept this world opinion.
Almost one year later, as Belize prepared for its
independence celebrations, it submitted its application for
OAS membership. In October, prior to its application's
consideration, Belize withdrew it due to impending
Guatemalan objections that would have prevented its ap-
proval. The OAS Charter itself indicates that if any extra-
continental country, such as the United Kingdom, is having a
territorial dispute with a member state, such as Guatemala,
and that territorial dispute has not been resolved through
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peaceful means, then the territory under dispute, such as
Belize, cannot be considered for membership by the General
Assembly of the OAS. 110 Although Belize could not be con-
sidered for membership, it did receive approval in an
October OAS vote for participation as an observer in the
General Assembly meeting scheduled for December 1981 at
St. Lucia. 111
Membership in the OAS remains illusive for Belize. It
has suggested that the Charter be amended to eliminate the
power of Guatemala's objections, especially in view of the
overwhelming support that Belize has maintained. Despite
this, the status quo still exists. In his October 1984
address to the U. N. General Assembly, Carl Rogers used the
opportunity to chastise the OAS membership for their "pas-
sive acceptance" of Belize's exclusion from their organiza-
1 1 otion. x * He indicated that this ran counter to these coun-
tries protestations of friendship and regional cooperation
and that it contributed to the slowing down of Belize's
1 1 odevelopment process.
International Monetary Fund and World Bank
During the time that Belize submitted its bid for OAS
membership, it also requested to join the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development (IBRD or World Bank). 114 Belize was
represented at the thirty-sixth annual Joint Meeting of the
IMF and World Bank in October 1981 when they considered its
application. Belize was formally admitted in February 1982
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and it immediately went to work on requesting World Bank
assistance.
Two different IMF/World Bank teams visited Belize
during 1982 to study its financial needs and requests.
Their findings were evidently sufficient justification for
Belize to receive a $5.3 million loan which was signed at
the World Bank headquarters in Washington, D. C. during
Prime Minister Price's May 1983 visit to the United States.
Earlier in 1983, an IMF advisor was assigned to the Belize
Ministry of Finance for a one year study to further evaluate
Belize's finances. In a very short time Belize has most
definitely profited from its membership in the IMF and World
Bank. Its gains are only partially measured in dollars
however. Belize biggest gain was perhaps in the international
prestige and recognition that its membership represented.
Belize had definitely arrived.
European Economic Community
Belize's colonial status up until 1981 automatically
included it in the European Economic Community (EEC) group-
ing of Overseas Colonies and Territories (OCT). As an OCT,
Belize was eligible for economic assistance from the EEC
through the European Development Fund (EDF) in accordance
with the provisions of the first and second Lome Conven-
tions. Although eligible for assistance, the amount af-
forded members of the OCT group was minimal. Upon attaining
independence, however, Belize status switched to that of one
of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, and
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the aid afforded ACP countries was substantial both in
dollar terms, trade privileges and development assistance.
Belize was formally included as the fifty-eighth member
of the ACP grouping in early 1982. This provided it with
preferential trade status with the countries of the European
Economic Community. Additionally, Belize was eligible to
receive aid from the EDF. By June of 1982, EDF aid total-
ling $7.5 million in loans and grants had been approved. ^°
In an effort to shore up this support and to solicit
more foreign trade, the Belizean Minister of Natural
Resources toured several of the member countries of the EEC
shortly after this generous assistance was committed. He
visited the headquarters of the EEC in Brussels, Belgium, as
well as the United Kingdom, West Germany and France. Ever
since Belize gained its independence, it has maintained a
diplomatic mission at the EEC headquarters. It was in fact
one of the first seven diplomatic missions that Belize
created. 118
Apart from continued assistance of the EEC, such as an
education program approved in March of 1984, Belize has also
enjoyed good relations with most of the member states. Many
of them were represented at Belize's independence ceremonies
in 1981 and many of them maintain diplomatic relations with
Belize
.
France is one member of the EEC that seems to have
taken a particular interest in Belize. A French warship
119
visited Belize for a four day port visit in June 1982. -^
Later during that year, a French delegation visited Belize
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to discuss joint agricultural cooperation. 120 As a further
reflection of their continuing warm relations, in July
1983, Belize upgraded its diplomatic mission to France by
appointing a non-resident ambassador. 121
Other Organizations and Nations
Upon attaining independence, Belize joined a number of
other international organizations, although most of them
were of a special interest nature. These groups included
the International Postal Union, the World Meteorological
Organization and the International Labor Organization.
The Belize Foreign Ministry has increased its work
load substantially since 1981. At its independence, Belize
hosted representatives of sixty-one nations. Many of them
also sought to establish diplomatic relations. Most of the
these nations had already established some kinship ties
with Belize through their joint association in international
forums. This was especially true of Belize's Commonwealth
brethren and EEC supporters. Since the initial surge of
applications, others have also been received. Two of the
most recent countries to establish diplomatic relations with
Belize were Pakistan in April 1984 and Japan in June 1984. JLJ
As of October 1984 a total of twenty-six countries had
established diplomatic relations with Belize and eight
others maintained consular associations.
As a small country, Belize is obviously limited in the
human and financial resources available to it for the main-
tenance of an extensive diplomatic network abroad. Limited
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diplomatic resources is a phenomenon not unique to Belize.
It is a characteristic common to virtually all small coun-
tries, including small countries much larger than Belize. 125
(Among small countries really only Cuba is an exception to
limited diplomatic resources.) Belize has managed to expand
its seven original diplomatic missions in some cases by
requiring its ambassadors to perform double duty. As an
example, the resident High Commissioner to the United
Kingdom is also the non-resident ambassador to France.
Similarly, the resident ambassador to the United States is
also the non-resident High Commissioner to Canada.
These new and expanding international linkages are
most definitely an indicator of Belize's achievement of
international stature. Its struggle to "arrive" however,
has not been an easy one. Nowhere is this more clearly seen
then in Belize's relations with its Central American neigh-
bors and the United States. They were the last to finally
side with Belize at the United Nations, but, since shifting
their support, they (except Guatemala) have become some of
Belize's most ardent supporters.
Latin American Nations
Although Belize is geographically located on the main-
land of Central America, its history, culture and politics
have been much more in line with the island Caribbean na-
tions, particularly those with similar British origins.
Because of its differences, and in spite of its location,
until very recently, Belize had generally been excluded from
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most inter-American activities. Much of the reasoning be-
hind this state of affairs rests with Belize itself. As a
British Crown Colony during most of the twentieth century,
it simply did not desire nor attempt to interact with its
Latin neighbors. The successful 1940s White Book campaign
by Guatemala also undoubtedly continued to bias the feelings
of the Latin American countries with regard to their own
affairs with Guatemala's wayward province. Consequently,
when Belize began to press its diplomatic initiative in the
1970s, it had to contend with virtually unanimous Latin
American opposition to its independence struggle.
Although one of Belize's earliest memberships in an
international organization was in ECLA, it was never a very
active participant. The early 1960s, when Belize joined
ECLA, was also the time when the PUP Government was suc-
cessful in achieving self-government from Britain as a step
towards independence. In realizing that it was the unre-
solved Guatemalan issue that would separate Belize from its
next step in constitutional advancement, it began a diplo-
matic initiative among its Latin American neighbors.
In 1965, Premier George Price toured Central America
and Mexico where he was reportedly well received by the press
and the Heads of Governments. He was especially well
received in Mexico where its new President-elect gave Belize
a pledge of support. The President-elect stated:
The historical links which unite us, the ever increas-
ingly friendly relations and the observance of the prin-
ciples of international co-existence—which is defended
by Mexico with such zeal and perseverance—are reason
enough to accentuate our solidarity for the noble people
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of Belize in their quest for their liberty and indepen-
dence.
Two years later, while visiting Guatemala, the Mexican
President also spoke out in favor of Belize's right to self-
1 9 ftdetermination. °
This early support from Mexico, while undoubtedly
appreciated by Belize, was partially proffered for ulterior
motives. In opposing the Guatemalan position, Mexico was
also opposing the United States position on the Anglo-
Guatemalan dispute. During the 1960s, it seemed Mexico
intentionally chose positions at odds with the United States
in order to demonstrate its own independence and non-
reliance on its larger northern neighbor. Mexico's support
of Belize was also seen as a way of increasing the willing-
ness of the Commonwealth Caribbean countries to open their
doors to Mexico as a new trading partner. These new oppor-
tunities undoubtedly benefitted Mexico financially and poli-
tically as it sought to broaden its own base of interna-
tional relations.
Despite any ulterior motives in its support, Mexico
did continue to favor Belize. In 1974, Mexico participated
in a forum of Latin American leaders at Guyana. One of the
outcomes of that meeting was a declaration of support for
the Guatemalan position in the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute.
Mexico refused to endorse the declaration.
Although Mexico did maintain its verbal support of
Belize, once Belize sought to internationalize its plight in
the United Nations, Mexico did not initially vote in favor
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of the U. N. resolutions. It was not until 1977, after two
previous votes, that Mexico's vote reflected the rhetoric it
had long espoused. Mexico's reluctance to lend early voting
support was largely attributed to its faithfulness to
Guatemala and the Latin American bloc. By 1977, this simply
was not enough. Once Mexico did come out openly in support
of Belize, it did so in full force. Prior to the U. N. vote
of 1977, Mexican President Jose Lopez Portillo issued a
clear declaration of support for the right of the people of
Belize to self-determination.
Through the remainder of the 1970s, Mexico was a
staunch supporter of Belizean independence, and its support
undoubtedly influenced other countries to shift their alle-
giance as well. It is representative of Mexico's efforts on
behalf of Belize to note that it cosponsored both the 1980
Fourth Committee and General Assembly resolutions that
finally brought Belize to independence. The New Belize
reported in December 1980 that, "to have our big neighbour
take such a positive and dynamic stand on behalf of our
independence, our territorial integrity, our security is
indeed an important step forward." XJ ^
At Belize's Independence Day, Mexico's delegation of
eight was one of the larger contingents to join the ceremo-
nies. Three days later in the U. N., Mexico was the first
country to officially recognize the U. N.'s newest member.
In addressing the General Assembly, Mexico's Foreign




for Mexico, the independence of Belize is an
example of how through the organizations that the
international community has set to live in peace and
harmony, it is possible to implement the most noble
principles and in particular that which embodies the
foreign policy of my government, the free determina-
tion of the people. 3 ^
In January 1982, Mexico and Belize signed a five year
renewable cultural exchange agreement. It was a far reach-
ing exchange that encompassed everything from library ex-
change programs and copyright protection to supporting
sporting competitions. Several months later, Mexico and
Belize signed another agreement whereby Mexico agreed to
provide electrical power to some of the Belize border
areas. Another example of Mexico's assistance occurred in
December 1982 with the grand opening and dedication of a new
Technical Agricultural High School. Mexico built and paid
for the school as a gift for Belize. The year 1982 alone
was most definitely a good year in Mexican-Belizean
relations
.
As Mexico worked in 1983 with its other Latin American
neighbors on a peace solution for Central America, it sought
to keep Belize informed of its efforts. In fact, diplomatic
representatives from Mexico, Colombia and Venezuela called
on Prime Minister Price to seek his endorsement of the
Cancun Declaration for Peace in Central America. The docu-
ment condemned the use of force as a means of settling
disputes and it called for adherence to the principles of
non-intervention, self-determination, and sovereignty.
Belize offered its full endorsement and Prime Minister Price
expressed his sincere appreciation to the countries' diplo-
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mats for their interest in keeping Belize apprised of their
actions
.
During this same visit, Mexico and Venezuela also
presented Belize with agreements that renewed their energy
cooperation programs. This program was one in which these
oil rich countries were providing oil to their fellow Latin
American countries at reduced prices.
Mexican-Belizean relations remain mutually beneficial
today. It is perhaps particularly helpful for Belize that
Mexico, although friendly with both Guatemala and Belize,
does favor the Belize side of their continuing dispute.
This cannot help but have some restraining effect on
Guatemala's ideas about ever actively pursuing a military
solution to its claims.
Even though Mexico was one of the first Latin American
countries to offer Belize vocal support, Panama was the
first Latin American country to lend its diplomatic support
at the U. N. In 1976, Panama came out openly in favor of
Belizean independence. Its bold and courageous move was to
serve as the catalyst for other Latin American countries to
relinquish their outdated support for Guatemala. Panama's
support was unwavering through the remainder of Belize's
independence struggle. It consistently cosponsored U. N.
Fourth Committee and General Assembly resolutions, as well
as speaking out in other regional forums on Belize's behalf.
Upon the establishment of Belize's independent status,
Panama was the first country to establish resident ambassa-
dorial level diplomatic relations. Since then, Panama has
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offered some assistance towards the training of the
Belizean Defense Force. 38 Most recently, in July of 1984,
Panama and Belize signed a cultural exchange agreement to
further their close relations.
The basis for the Panama-Belize relationship seems to
have been largely due to a close personal affection between
Panama's General Torrijos and Belize's George Price. During
Premier Price's diplomatic initiative in Central America,
General Torrijos reportedly gained a keen sense of admira-
tion for Premier Price and the plight of his people and
country. Price in turn was fully supportive and admiring of
the then ongoing negotiations between Panama and the United
States over the Panama Canal. Upon General Torrijos' un-
timely death in a plane crash on 31 July 1981, George Price
took time away from his busy preparations for independence
to attend the funeral. The following year on the anniver-
sary of General Torrijos' death, Premier Price held a memo-
rial mass in Belize to honor him. The warm relations
between Panama and Belize continue today, most recently
exemplified by Prime Minister Price's attendance at the
October 1984 inauguration of Panama's new President
Barletta. 141
Belize's relationships with the South American coun-
tries has remained very limited. A few of them did become
outspoken advocates of Belizean independence during the
1970s U. N. struggle, but very little long term interest in
Belize ever developed. Belize participates with these coun-
tries in various international forums and they recognize it
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as a sovereign state, yet, due to such limited contact very
few of them maintain any type of diplomatic relations.
Colombia, Argentina and Venezuela were some of the earliest
U. N. converts after Panama broke the Latin American bloc
support for Guatemala. It was also these four countries and
Brazil, that were the only Latin origin South American
countries represented at Belize's Independence Day. 142
(The only other South American countries in attendance were
Surinam and Guyana.)
As Venezuela tries to play an ever increasing leader-
ship role in the Caribbean basin its support for Belize has
remained strong. It continues to provide oil at reduced
prices to Belize through its joint oil assistance program
with Mexico. It also signed two different declarations
along with Belize during August 1982. The heads of govern-
ment attending the inauguration of Salvador Jorge Blanco as
President of the Dominican Republic and those attending the
inauguration of Belazario Betancourt as President of
Colombia, signed documents supporting the goals of the
United Nations and the principles of the non-use of force in
settling disputes.
Belizean-Colombian relations have basically been lim-
ited to mutual representation at each others installations
of new Governments. Colombia has been active in Central
American peace proposals and consequently, it has been more
frequently represented at various forums of Central American
and Caribbean nations which include Belize. For example,
Colombia was the only South American participant in a meet-

107
ing of Central American and Caribbean Foreign Ministers in
Costa Rica during October of 1982. Prime Minister Price did
attend a ceremony in June 1983 at Cartegena de las Indias,
Colombia, marking the 450th anniversary of the founding of
that city. He was one of twenty visiting representatives of
other countries that joined together during their visit to
Colombia to sign a declaration which called for "dialogue in
order to overcome the existing antagonism among American
States so as to remove the threat of war."144 Prime Minister
Price stated that the signing was conducted among a "fellow-
ship of Americans who desire peace and progress." Inter-
estingly, Guatemala was one of Belize's fellow signers.
Belize's relations with Argentina never had much time
to develop before the Falkland's War of 1982. When Belize
sided with Britain, Argentina shifted its support back to
the Guatemalan position in the Anglo-Guatemalan dispute.
Relations with Belize's Central American neighbors had
been fairly limited but relatively congenial through the
years. During Belize's diplomatic push of the 1960s and
1970s most of these countries did not oppose Belize's funda-
mental objectives, yet they sided with Guatemala in the
territorial dispute. As other Latin American countries
recognized the validity of Belize's rights, and as they saw
the entire Belize issue rise to international dimensions,
they slowly shifted their position. The New Belize referred
to the Latin American countries as being embarrassed by
Guatemala's claim to Belize and it indicated they refused to
continue to go along quietly and tacitly supporting
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Guatemala while its own expanionistic ambitions threatened
the peace of the Americas. 14 ^
Costa Rica was the first traditional Central American
country to support Belize's independence. Prior to the 1977
U. N. resolution, Costa Rica met with a group of countries
to discuss the Belize problem. It was not until 1979,
however, that Costa Rica actually voted in favor of Belizean
independence and openly opposed Guatemala's territorial
claim. Costa Rica continued to support the Belize resolu-
tions in 1980 and sent a representative to Belize's
September 1981 independence. Only a few months later, Costa
Rica and Belize announced that they would cooperate in
health matters. Costa Rica was to provide doctors for
teaching as well as practicing in Belize, and it opened
Costa Rican medical facilities for the treatment of
Belizeans. In March 1982, Costa Rica also became the first
Central American country to establish ambassadorial level
diplomatic relations. As Central America's only two true
democracies— in political practice as well as governmental
structure—Costa Rica and Belize have continued to share
good relations and mutual concern over the turmoil within
Central America.
Nicaragua was undergoing its own violent internal
turmoil during the height of the Belize struggle in the
1970s and 1980s. Under the Somoza regime, Nicaragua was an
ardent defender of the Guatemalan territorial claim, yet,
the Sandinistas, who opposed him were very sympathetic to
the Belizean cause. Prior to the Sandinista's successful
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August 1979 revolution, Premier George Price had nurtured
the Sandinistas' support for Belize such that upon their
attainment of power, they shifted the Nicaraguan position
dramatically in favor of Belize. 148 During the 1979 U. N.
votes on Belize, Nicaragua cosponsored the resolutions call-
ing for Belizean independence. It also attended the Belize
Independence ceremonies with a contingent of twelve people.
That number was second only to the United States. 149 Out of
mutual respect and support, George Price also attended the
first three annual anniversary celebrations of the
Sandinista Revolution. Belizean teachers were also provided
to Nicaragua to assist in a literacy campaign for
Nicaragua's English speaking areas.
In the year that followed Belize's participation in
the 1982 Sandinista Revolution Anniversary celebration,
Belizean expressions of support for the Nicaraguan Govern-
ment stopped. Belize has also not participated in any
later celebrations. 5 While some attribute this to
effective pressure from the United States, the realities of
a changing political situation in Nicaragua must also have
effected the Belizean Government's sentiments.
Belize's relations with El Salvador have remained very
limited. El Salvador did eventually support Belize at the
United Nations and it sent a delegation to Belize's Indepen-
dence festivities. Belize, in turn, sent a representative
to the inauguration of President Duarte in July of 1984.
Presently, many Salvadoran refugees and expatriates have
moved to Belize. The Belizean Government has offered some
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aid to the displaced peasant refugees in the way of social
services and land. The group referred to as expatriates,
however, are generally of a higher income level and they
have relocated Salvadoran businesses, bought into Belizean
businesses or created new ones. Consequently, among many
native Belizeans the new and expanding Salvadoran presence
is not an altogether welcomed one.-'- 52
Honduras also eventually supported Belize at the
United Nations although it was the last of the Central
American countries to do so. It also sent a representative
to Belize in September 1981 for Independence Day. In March
of 1984, Honduras took the initiative to strengthen its
relations with Belize. Upon the invitation of Honduran
President Roberto Suazo Cordova, Prime Minister Price vis-
ited Honduras. They discussed a wide range of issues which
included establishing trade and cultural accords. Honduras
also expressed solidarity with Belize in its dispute with
Guatemala and it promised to support Belize's entrance into
the Central American Common Market and the Central American
1 C A ,Economic Integration Bank. Jrt The two countries did partici-
pate in a joint Caribbean pavillion with the Dominican
Republic at the 1984 World's Fair in New Orleans, Louisiana.
Overall, Belize's relations with its Latin American
neighbors, and particularly its Central American neighbors,
are sorely lacking in substance. This is largely attributed
to Guatemala's continuing military threat, its still preva-
lent influence and the Central American turbulence. Most of
Belize's foreign aid comes from outside the region as well
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as most of its trade. Belize would apparently like to be
more fully integrated into regional cooperative arrange-
ments, especially those that would afford Belize economic
advantages. It strongly supported the Kissinger Commission
proposal for the formation of a Central American Development
"ICC
Organization. -'-' Belize would also like to be included in
other existing Latin American forums that presently exclude
it. On the other hand, Belize has refused to join some
Central American organizations, such as the Central American
Democratic Community and the Central American Defense
Council (CONDECA), despite the urgings of the United
States. 5 Belize most definitely still has work to do in
expanding and strengthening its relations in Latin America.
Its inability to do so in most cases, rest with the con-
tinuing Guatemalan predicament. Its reluctance to do so in
other cases rests with the paradox of remaining an indepen-
dent country of Anglican origins, traditions and language in
the midst of an ever encroaching Latin influence.
United States
The United States' involvement in the Belize terri-
tory, extends back to the nineteenth century, although its
early involvement was primarily through Britain. An exami-
nation of Belize-United States relations since the early
1960s—during Belize's early fight for independence
—
provides a more valuable view of their relationship.
In the early 1960s, the Belizean Government worked
vigorously towards a negotiated settlement of the Anglo-
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Guatemalan dispute. Negotiations were held in 1962 in
Puerto Rico and again in 1965 in Miami, Florida. The United
States 1 only involvement in these negotiations was in their
having been held on U. S. territory; this, however, was soon
to change. Following the failure of the Miami negotiations,
Belize, Britain and Guatemala decided to request that the
United States mediate their dispute. President Johnson
agreed to their request and appointed an international
attorney, Mr. Bethuel Webster, to act as the mediator. Mr.
Webster took almost three years to complete his study of the
Anglo-Guatemalan dispute and to produce his report, which
took the form of a draft treaty between Britain and
Guatemala. 57 He presented his proposals 26 April 1968. 158
The Belizean Government was quick to voice its opposi-
tion to the Webster proposals due to their suggestion of the
"gross erosion" of Belizean sovereignty. The Government
did however distribute the Webster report throughout Belize
in order to gain public opinion. "The response was a com-
plete rejection." The proposal itself called largely for
the incorporation of Belize into Guatemala. The United
Kingdom, finding this just as unacceptable as Belize, joined
with it in rejecting the proposals. In an address to the
Belize House of Representatives, Premier George Price ex-
plained the reason for Belize's rejection. He stated:
The proposals create areas of obligatory conditions for
consultations and co-operation with Guatemala in speci-
fic activities of trade and economic development, move-
ment of people, foreign representation and defence--all
limiting our freedom of action as a sovereign state . .
Real independence status assumes that the country has
the right to determine its political, economic, defence,
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external, etc. arrangements. The document predetermines
the choice for us in many of these fields.-1- 61
The United States' designed Webster Plan clearly
showed the people of Belize that the U. S. sided with
Guatemala in its territorial claim. This as much as any-
thing provided impetus for the Belizean Government to inter-
nationalize the Belize issue through the use of interna-
tional forums. For the remainder of the 1960s and through-
out much of the 1970s, the Belize issue was for the most
part a non-issue for the United States. The Belize-
Guatemalan territorial dispute gained virtually no attention
from the U. S. Government and relations with Belize itself
were generally limited to trade and minor assistance
programs.
United States' aid to Belize during this period was
primarily limited to indirect aid from U. S. funded
Caribbean assistance organizations and special work projects
of the U. S. Peace Corps. Various locations in the United
States did serve as neutral meeting grounds for periodic
negotiations among Belize, Britain and Guatemala, but, the
U. S. did not become directly involved.
The United States abstained consistently in the United
Nations' votes on Belize's independence during the 1970s.
It was accused of standing "aloof" during the ever increas-
ing rise of international support for Belizean indepen-
dence. 16 -^ A minor breakthrough appeared to have occurred in
July of 1978, when U. S. President Jimmy Carter, in present-
ing the opening speech of the General Assembly of the
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Organization of American States, "pledged his government's
willingness to join in the efforts to find a peaceful and
just solution to the problem of Belize." 164 President
Carter's words were seen as a very significant pledge of
support because it was the first time that any U. S.
President had ever addressed the Belize issue at an interna-
ls ctional forum. aj Unfortunately for Belize, President Carter's
pledge of support in 1978 did not translate into votes of
support at the United Nations during that year.
The United States continued to abstain from Belize
votes at the U. N. in 1978 and in 1979, although by then, it
remained one of only a handful of countries that had not
committed themselves to support Belizean independence. The
voting opposition had been entirely eliminated.
Several different explanations have been suggested as
to why the United States maintained its noncommittal posi-
tion for so long. The one offered as official explanation
was that the U. S. hoped its abstention would encourage a
negotiated settlement of the unresolved territorial dis-
pute. 66 Others have suggested that U. S. ties and loyalties
to Guatemala prevented the U. S. from taking any steps which
might further antagonize its once faithful Central American
ally. Guatemala had already become alienated from the U. S.
due to the human rights policies of the Carter administra-
tion which had singled Guatemala out as one of the world's
worst human rights offenders. Still others suggested that
although the U. S. was in favor of Belizean independence,
it simply was not in favor of independence falling into
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the hands of the current Belizean PUP Government. The
United States was suspicious of Premier George Price and his
cordial relations with Cuba and the socialist governments of
Grenada and Jamaica. It was suggested that an independent
Belize under the PUP "could become a Cuban foothold in
Central America."167
Regardless of the United States' previous reluctance
to commit itself to support Belizean independence, its sup-
port was finally forthcoming at the United Nations' votes of
1980. Speculation of U. S. support had circulated for
months prior to the Fourth Committee and General Assembly
resolutions, but, it was not confirmed until the actual
U. N. votes of November 1980. 68 In supporting the indepen-
dence resolution, the United States also praised the nego-
tiating efforts of Britain, Guatemala and Belize to resolve
their dispute, and urged them to continue their talks.
Their talks did continue, and in early 1981 Guatemala
seemed more amenable to British suggestions than it had in
years. Perhaps the reality of finally losing United States
indirect support as well as that of its Latin American
brothers finally jolted Guatemala to recognize the futility
of its anachronistic claim. The March 1981 Heads of Agree-
ment brought great optimism that the long diplomatic strug-
gle was finally going to allow Belize to enter into an
unthreatened secure independence. The United States shared
in this optimism and amidst its highpoint, a substantial aid
agreement was signed between Premier Price and Mr. William
Wheeler, the head of the U. S. Agency for International
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Development (AID). 169 Previous U. S. aid to Belize had
primarily been received through such channels as CARICOM. 170
Unfortunatley, Guatemala's cooperative spirit changed
abruptly in July 1981, when the negotiations ended at a
standstill. This did not prevent Belize from celebrating
its September independence. The Honorable Daniel Mica, a
member of the House of Representatives and the Honorable
Thomas Enders, the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, were the ranking members of a fifteen
person delegation. Although United States' support was slow
in materializing, the U. S. certainly made up for it in its
presence at Belmopan. While in Belize, Mr. Enders also
indicated that the U. S. had already had talks with the
Guatemalan Government about "giving up any idea of taking
away the freedom that the citizens of Belize were celebrat-
171mg so warmly."
Almost two months later, Belize received more official
visitors from the United States. Military officers from the
U. S. Southern Command in Panama paid a three day visit to
172discuss military assistance to the Belizean Defense Force.
During this same time period, rumors indicated that Prime
Minister Price participated in secret talks on the possi-
bility of the United States establishing a military base for
171
U. S. troops to be used for jungle training.
In January of 1982, an agreement was announced that
the United States would provide training to the Belizean
Defense Force in the U. S. and Panama, and on location in
Belize. For the latter, the U. S. was to provide a small
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contingent of military advisors to be stationed in Belize. 174
No plans for a military base were included nor have any
since been revealed.
Almost one month after the military agreement,
President Reagan announced his Caribbean Basin Initiative.
This was met favorably in Belize due to its anticipated
share of forthcoming aid. Ongoing aid programs from the May
1981 U. S. AID agreement were already assisting greatly. A
June 1982 article in the New Belize indicated that these
funds were being used to upgrade and improve the electrical
distribution system throughout Belize. ' 5
While attending the Colombian presidential inauguara-
tion in April 1982, Prime Minister Price had the opportunity
to meet briefly with Vice-President Bush. They reportedly
17 6discussed Belizean affairs. While most events of 1982
seemed to indicate that Belize-United States relations were
developing favorably, on two different occasions Prime
Minister Price was ostensibly snubbed by President Reagan.
President Reagan spent a working holiday in the
Commonwealth Caribbean during the month of April. While in
Barbados, he invited the leaders of five of the Commonwealth
177Caribbean nations to meet him there for talks. Belize was
excluded from this group. Similarly, when President Reagan
invited the Central American Heads of Government to meet
with him in San Pedro Sula, Honduras, following a December
17 8tour of Latin America, Belize was once again excluded. /0
This snub followed closely after a November CARICOM meeting
in which Jamaica sought to have the left-wing government of
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Grenada expelled. Prime Minister Price opposed this action
and was successful in stopping it. His actions were not
viewed favorably by the United States. Belize had already
antagonized the U. S. over Grenada by attending the anniver-
sary celebrations of the Bishop-led Grenada revolution,
despite U. S. diplomatic pressure to do otherwise. 179 Addi-
tionally, Belize had recently refused to join the U. S.
sponsored Central American Democratic Community. 180
As 1983 began, it became apparent that President
Reagan's actions were designed to send a clear signal to
Belize about United States' displeasure with its occasional
left-wing stance. Belize recognized this and Prime Minister
Price seemed to mend his ways somewhat. He obviously
recognized the value of U. S. friendship and he seemed to
want it maintained. Consequently, Belize's participation in
the Sandinista Revolution Anniversary celebrations ended in
1982, and the 1981 Cuban offers of commercial and diplomatic
ties were never fully developed.
In January of 1983, the United States upgraded its
diplomatic relations with Belize to the ambassadorial level.
A defense attache was also assigned to handle the new mili-
tary relationship. Near the beginning of 1983, a portion of
Belize's $10 million in Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)
funds was made available. This initially went into housing
181programs and balance of payment supports. ox In addition,
another separate aid package of $4 million for housing
projects was received from AID. The year 1983 certainly
seemed to be beginning more favorably than 1982 ended,
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particularly with regard to presidential relations. In
fact, President Reagan sent an invitation in March to Prime
Minister Price, inviting him to a White House meeting on
12 May 1983. Mr. Price accepted this invitation for what was
to be a historic first for the new nation of Belize.
Prime Minister Price preceded his day at the White
House with another day in Washington, D. C. He was honored
by the International Center for Entreprenuers at a luncheon
at the Hall of Flags in the United States Chamber of
Commerce building. He also delivered an address at
Georgetown University. The Reverend Timothy Healy,
President of Georgetown University, described Mr. Price as:
"A hero of his country, the Father of its Independence and
1 ft o
a Prime Minister of a moral and democratic country." °
The White House agenda for 12 May included an Oval
Office meeting, a Cabinet Room meeting, a working luncheon
in the State Dining Room and statements to reporters on the
White House lawn. Prior to this, Mr. Price had meetings
with officials of the State Department and the Agency for
International Development. In their meetings, Mr. Reagan
and Mr. Price reportedly discussed the situation in Central
America and Belize's relationships with its troubled neigh-
bors. They also discussed trade, economic matters and secu-
rity issues for Belize. 83 Some sources also indicate that
President Reagan suggested moving the U. S. School of the
Americas to Belize after it closed in Panama at the end of
1984. 184
The statements made to the press at the end of the
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day's meetings were short in duration, but, both men seemed
to indicate that the day had been a success. President
Reagan stated:
In contrast to the war and turmoil of the region,
Belize—Central America's newest independent democracy
—
serves as a model of peace and stability .... Our
discussions have been productive and cordial, and have
taken place in an atmosphere of trust and mutual re-
spect. These conversations have reaffirmed the close
relationships between our two nations, the friendships
of our people, and our mutual commitment to freedom and
human rights. 85
Prime Minister Price commented:
Our exchange of views served to further the good
relations between our two countries. Belize is
thankful for the Caribbean Basin Initiative and the
helpful cooperation of your people and your Government
in our daily task to maintain stability and security
which result from mutual respect and recognition of
Belize's sovereignty and territorial integrity . . . . iyb
Before leaving the United States, Prime Minister Price
also visited the headquarters of the World Bank, the head-
quarters of C.A.R.E., the United Nations and Belizean commu-
nities in Chicago, Houston, Los Angelos and New Orleans.
The city visits were arranged primarily to promote U. S.
investment in Belize. To assist this end, the Marketing
Service of the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
(OPIC) gave a briefing in Houston that commented favorably
187
on the investment climate of Belize.
One month after Mr. Price's visit to the United
States, the U. S. reciprocated by sending Ambassador Richard
Stone, the special envoy to Central America, for a visit as
part of a ten country familiarization tour. While he was in
Belize, he noted that Belize was in a strategic position and
that the United States was very interested in Belize's well-
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being, prosperity and security. 8
In October 1983, Belize and the United States found
themselves once more at odds over Grenada. Belize condemned
the invasion of Grenada by the United States and the other
participating CARICOM countries. This, however, did not
appear to have any deleterious effects on their relation-
ship. In November, the United States approved a two million
dollar home loan program and in December, Belize assigned a
permanent resident ambassador to the United States. It had
previously relied upon a non-resident ambassador.
Mr. Edney C. Cain presented his ambassadorial creden-
tials to President Reagan in ceremonies on the White House
lawn. He told President Reagan that Belize was heartened by
the support being given by the Government and people of the
United States in helping to solve the unfounded territorial
claim by Guatemala. President Reagan, in reply, said that
the United States valued the cordial relations and spirit of
friendship and goodwill that existed between Belize and the
United States. 189
During January of 1984, Belize gained the attention of
Washington at least two more times. British Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher and President Reagan had an opportunity to
meet, and, among their discussions was Belize. Mrs.
Thatcher had long been intent on pulling the British troops
out of Belize and she had indicated that she would do so
soon. President Reagan apparently persuaded her to do
1 90
otherwise.
The Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on
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Central America (or the Kissinger Commission Report, as it
is more commonly referred) was also released in January
1984. While the report did not discuss Belize in political
and military matters, it did include Belize in its economic
recommendations. It called for the creation of a Central
American Development Corporation (CADC) that would be used
to stimulate private investment in the region. The Commis-
sion envisioned CADC to include Belize. 191 This idea met very
favorable acceptance within Belize and Belizeans have since
encouraged its formation. 92
In March 1984, Belize once again gained U. S. atten-
tion when the State Department released its human rights
studies. For the year 1983, Belize was given a "clean bill
of health—free of any violations."193 This record was very
typical for Belize yet very atypical for the Central
American region. This is undoubtedly one of the primary
reasons why the Carter White House finally shifted its
support to Belize in 1980.
During the remainder of 1984, Belizean-United States
relations seemed to be spotlighted on military matters. In
April, a U. S. Navy warship visited Belize. The ship's
commanding officer was greeted warmly by the Prime Minister
and the two exchanged momentos of the ship's visit. Prime
Minister Price had previously welcomed and toured other
U. S. Navy ships; he toured one during a previous port
visit in April 1981 and he toured an aircraft carrier off
the coast of Honduras in August 1983.
An announcement of military assistance was also made
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in June. The U. S. agreed to provide the Belizean Defense
Force with one million dollars worth of military equipment.
This included entirely nonlethal gear comprised of such
articles as uniforms, tents, backpacks and medical sup-
194plies. During this same time, press reports began circu-
lating in the United States, indicating that the U. S. was
planning to build a military base in Belize. Belize denied
that any such plans existed. 19 -*
Although Belize did deny that any plans existed, spec-
ulation of an increased U. S. military presence in Belize
was not entirely unfounded. With the British eager to end
their "appropriate period" of involvement, the United States
seemed a likely candidate to fill the void, as long as the
Guatemalan threat persisted.
The U. S. and Belizean positions have been to keep
the British troops in Belize. In a press interview, Malcolm
Barnebey, the U. S. Ambassador to Belize, was asked whether
or not he thought U. S. forces would ever move in if the
British forces pulled out. The Ambassador responded: "Our
position is we want the British to stay. We haven't decided
what we would do if they left."196
As to the Belizean position on the United States
replacing Britain, George Price and Belize's new Prime
Minister, Manuel Esquivel have both maintained that a U. S.
troop presence was not desired. 197 Others feel that a major-
19 8ity of Belizeans would welcome a U. S. troop presence.
Regardless of desire, it would seem that if Britain ever did
withdraw its troops in the face of a continuing Guatemalan
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threat, and if the United States was willing to replace the
British, that the Belizean Government would have very little
choice except to accept a U. S. military presence.
It would seem, however, that a U. S. presence such as
a relocated School of the Americas, would have the same sort
of deterrent effect on Guatemala as an actual defensive
garrison. It has already appeared as though United States'
interest in Belize has calmed Guatemalan hostilities. y With
the exception of a few small border incidents, the
Guatemalan-Belize border has remained peaceful. Guatemalan
military movements like those of the 1970s which seemed to
be preparations for invasions have not occurred since the
U. S. first began making overtures of support to Belize in
1979.
Whether or not the United States ever does become more
involved militarily in Belize, it will undoubtedly continue
to become more involved in all other spheres. The U. S.
Drug Enforcement Agency recently established an office in
Belize in order to help Belize interdict drug trafficking
between Belize and the United States. 200 The Voice of
America also announced in December 1984 that it would build
a radio station in Belize in order to provide Spanish lan-
201guage broadcast throughout Central America.
Economically, Belize is vastly dependent on the
United States. In 1980, even before an expanded trade
relationship, the United States consumed eighty percent of
Belize's exports. 202 Belize has also become reliant upon
the U. S. aid programs of the Peace Corps and the Agency
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for International Development. The Peace Corps program
currently consist of eighty volunteers and the AID pro-
grams have become so numerous that an AID mission was
established in Belize in January of 1983.
Belize-United States relations have indeed developed
substantially since the onset of Belizean independence.
Nowhere is this more evident than in the activity around the
U. S. Embassy in Belize City. The staff has multiplied
exponentially in a short span of four years. The motor pool
alone consist of sixty-three vehicles. Plans are also
underway for an entirely new embassy compound in the capital
city of Belmopan. Belize-United States relations have in-
deed become substantial. In assessing Belize's future, the




BELIZE: 1984 AND BEYOND
1984 Elections
On 14 December 1984, a new chapter began in Belize's
history. George Price and his PUP faced electoral defeat
and in turn lost control of the Government for the very
first time. The reigns of power were handed to the victo-
rious Manuel Esquivel and his conservative United Democratic
Party (UDP).
The December elections were the first for an indepen-
dent Belize, and although they were scheduled, their date
was only established six weeks before the balloting. The
1984 elections included an additional ten seats in the House
of Representatives for a total of twenty-eight elected rep-
resentatives. This increase necessitated a complete redis-
ricting of the constituencies. The short political cam-
paign focused predominately on economic issues, as opposed
to the independence issue that had dominated all previous
Belizean national elections. The campaign was also charac-
terized by active mudslinging which had "long been a staple
of Belizean politics." Prime Minister Price was personally
accused of mismanaging the country's economy, abusing his
political power and being "too friendly to socialist govern-
ments in Nicaragua and Cuba. He was also called a
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traitor, Communist, racist, homosexual, and gangster. 3
The election outcome resulted in the UDP acquiring
twenty-one seats and the PUP seven seats. It was an over-
whelming and largely unexpected victory. In his own dis-
trict, George Price was defeated by a vote of 876-570. He
lost to a twenty-five year old political newcomer named
Derek Aikman. The country's voters clearly seemed to feel
that since the PUP had achieved its primary objective of
independence, that it was time for a change. They were
simply tired of George Price. Consequently, the election
was less a victory for the UDP than it was a defeat for the
PUP—votes for the UDP were less votes of support than they
were votes in opposition to the PUP.
A political analysis of the 1984 election identifies
four primary reasons for the PUP's loss of support. First
and foremost is the fact that the PUP lost its cause. After
the attainment of independence, the PUP simply did not have
a raison d'etre . Secondly, the factions within the PUP
split over party policies. The leader of the conservative
faction within the PUP resigned from the party in early 1984
and in so doing claimed that the party was influenced by an
international communist conspiracy. A third reason for the
PUP's defeat was the expansion of the House of Representa-
tives and the consequent redistricting of constituences.
When the new districts were created by the Government, it
seemed they were proportioned with the obvious intent of
providing an advantage to the PUP. In effect, the new
districts weakened PUP strongholds. The fourth and final
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issue which contributed to the PUP's defeat had to do with
the economy. This had been the focus of the UDP's campaign
because the Belizean economy under the PUP Government had
floundered. It had relied too heavily on the single crop of
sugarcane for export earnings as well as borrowing heavily
on the international market to support the economy. The UDP
favored a more diverse agricultural economy, including at-
tracting foreign investments and developing tourism. Al-
though, the PUP had not been opposed to these things, it
simply had not created the necessary incentives to attract
investors. For whatever the reasons that the PUP may have
lost the election, the fact remains that the UDP now con-
trols the Government in Belize.
The new Prime Minister, Manuel Esquivel, is relatively
new to politics. He helped to form the UDP in 1973, served
as its party chairman from 1976-1982, and assumed the party
leadership in January 1983. In a very short time he arose
from obscurity as a college physics professor to the pin-
nacle of political power as his nation's Prime Minister.
Although the UDP was expected to reflect a different politi-
cal attitude and philosophy for Belize, no major changes
were anticipated with its victory. It remains to be seen as
to what will happen. The new Government, at this point, is
still establishing itself and any significant changes are
yet forthcoming.
Conclusion
Regardless of any changes that Prime Minister Esquivel
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may make, he cannot erase the record of international suc-
cess that Belize enjoyed under the leadership of George
Price. The PUP Government embarked upon a foreign policy in
the early 1960s that set out to gain the support of the
international community for the Belizean cause of self-
determination, sovereignty and territorial integrity. Sup-
port for these rights in turn evoked support for Belize's
independence and opposition to Guatemala's territorial
claim. Although, the diplomatic initiative required per-
severence and patience, it paid off handsomely in 1980 at
the United Nations when Belize received the vote of support
it needed to carry it to independence.
This remarkable record of success, which brought an
obscure British colony to international attention and trans-
formed it into a new international actor, is explained by
two dominant factors. One of these is the issue of indepen-
dence and the other is the long term tenure of the PUP
Government
.
The Belize issue of independence, or rather decoloni-
zation, was a popular issue that most countries could easily
support. It was also one of the primary concerns of the
United Nations. Much of the United Nation's work since its
creation has been initiated in the Fourth Committee. In
Belize's case, decolonization was complicated by the exis-
tence of the Guatemalan threat, but, it was this threat that
forced Belize to seek a wider appeal for its cause. In so
doing, Belize gained virtually universal support for its




It was the long term tenure of the PUP Government that
allowed the issue of independence to remain paramount in
Belize's foreign policy focus. The PUP was a one issue
party. The quest for independence, with its resultant
rights to self-determination, sovereignty and territorial
integrity, was central to virtually all aspects of PUP
governmental activity. In contrast, independence was not
the central issue of the leading opposition parties. Had
the PUP ever lost an election prior to the attainment of
independence in 1981, Belize would probably still remain a
British colony. There was in fact some concern voiced when
the UDP won the 1984 election that it would seek to reverse
Belize's independence; the now ruling UDP is after all the
same party that so adamantly opposed the Heads of Agreement
in March 1981 and boycotted the Independence Day ceremonies
of September 1981. Now that the UDP is the Government, it
does not desire to reverse Belize's independence, but, the
point is, the PUP's longevity in office provided continuity
of purpose towards the maintenance of the internationally
popular issue of decolonization. A different Government
might not have done so.
Within the PUP itself, the continuity of its leader-
ship also offered further assistance towards the maintenance
of the Belize issue. Carl Rogers and George Price became
very familiar figures at the various international forums
they attended in order to present Belize's case to the
world. They gained not only respect and admiration for
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their cause, but also lasting friendships which further
cemented the support that Belize accrued.
An additional aspect of the PUP's success from its
longevity in office relates to its political philosophy.
Although the PUP itself worked willingly within a democratic
parliamentary system of government, it did not shy away from
developing close contacts with countries of other political
persuasions. Belize was willing to do this because all it
really desired from these countries was their support of the
Belizean cause. The PUP Government itself contained members
of both right-wing and left-wing factions, but overall it
tried to maintain a middle-of-the-road policy. This open-
minded acceptance of diverse political systems in other
countries served the PUP Government well because it was able
to marshall support from almost all countries. Belize's
ability to gain the unanimous support from the diverse group
of nations that comprise the member states of the Non-
Aligned Movement and the Commonwealth of Nations serves as a
prime example of this.
Although Belize no longer needed support for indepen-
dence after 21 September 1981, it still nurtured the rela-
tionships it had developed. This nurturing seemed twofold;
it continued to provide support for Belize's continuing
struggle to insure its territorial integrity in the face of
a persistent Guatemalan threat and it provided friendships
with countries and organizations that were increasingly
willing to offer development assistance to Belize. A recent
assessment of the PUP Government's foreign policy objectives
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in the October 1984 New Belize , indicated that Belize's
foreign policy continued "to seek a solution to the
Guatemalan problem, more economic development and the pre-
servation of
. . . independence, sovereignty and territorial
integrity. 1" Although the new UDP Government is not
expected to make any fundamental changes in this type of
foreign policy, a review of likely prospects for change
seems in order.
Even before the victory of the UDP, the prospects for
Belize's future seemed to include a growing relationship
with the United States—what some referred to as a "new
colonialism" and a "new dependence." 8 Clearly, United
States' assistance and influence was increasing in Belize
under the PUP. It is expected to increase even more under
the UDP. Prime Minister Esquivel has stated that Belize
wants "to establish the best of relations with the United
Q
States of America." He has also stated, however, that he
hopes the Belize-United States relationship to be primarily
an economic one. During a press briefing after his election
he stated: "Our relations with the United States will depend
heavily on the possibility of getting . . . investment input
into Belize . . . ." 10 Toward this end, Prime Minister
Esquivel recently visited New Orleans, Louisiana on 24 March
1985, where he met with businessmen interested in investing
in Belize. 11 Whereas the PUP had also courted U. S.
investment, the UDP seems much more receptive to large
multinational corporations and foreign investment in devel-
oping Belizean potential for tourism.
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The principle issue of concern in future Belize-United
States relations, seems to be the prospect for an increasing
U. S. military presence. Regarding this, Prime Minister
Esquivel stated:
Our policy with regards to the United States and
Belize's security needs is a very simple one. We do not
believe, assuming a British withdrawal, that Belize
would require an American military presence in order to
secure our borders from a Guatemalan threat. The United
States of America is near enough to Belize. It is
obviously powerful enough, that all we would seek, if we
could have our wish, would be for the United States to
declare that it would not permit a Guatemalan invasion
of Belize. 12
With regards to Belize's future foreign policy, it is
expected to be much more closely allied with the United
States. Whereas the PUP Government was not hesitant to
condemn U. S. actions in Grenada or to offer verbal support
to such groups as the Palestinian Liberation Organization,
the UDP Government is much more likely to reflect views in
consonance with the United States. Belize's new Foreign
Minister Dean Barrow has already indicated that Belize's
foreign policy is "definitely pro-West.
"
XJ He has also
indicated, however, that Belize would not abandon its mem-
bership in the Non-Aligned Movement. Regarding this mainte-
nance of a relationship which the UDP previously criticized,
Mr. Barrow stated:
Belize's peculiar position in view of the Guatemalan
threat . . . obliges us to maintain contact with
governments whose political and ideological colouration
we might not all together endorse.
The UDP Government has already found itself sending a dele-
gation to the inauguration of Nicaraguan President Daniel
Ortega. In defending this action, Foreign Minister Barrow
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indicated that the Government's first responsibility in
foreign affairs was the maintenance of Belize's sovereign-
ty and territorial integrity and in that Nicaragua had
been a firm supporter of Belize's rights to these princi-
ples, the continuance of a Belizean-Nicaraguan relation-
ship was justified, despite past UDP objections. The UDP
has clearly realized the realities and constraints of a
party in office versus a party in opposition.
The UDP's policies towards resolving the Guatemalan
situation are not likely to be any different than the PUP.
The UDP has expressed its willingness to negotiate and in
fact, it has indicated that it is amenable to considering
the provisions of the 1981 Heads of Agreement—which it had
previously so adamantly opposed—as the basis for further
negotiations
.
Unfortunately, regardless of any Belizean Governments'
willingness to negotiate, it seems unlikely that any
Guatemalan Government will ever seriously negotiate a final
settlement. Within Guatemala, the Belize issue has served
as a scapegoat to distract its people from internal prob-
lems. The issue is one that rallies nationalistic senti-
ments; it has for years and it is likely to do so in the
future. The recent change to a hard line position by the
Guatemalan representative at the February 1985 negotia-
tions seems a perfect example. Fortunately, the unlikeli-
hood of there ever being a negotiated settlement is accom-
panied by the unlikelihood of Guatemala ever using
military action to recoup Belizean territory, especially
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if Belize maintains a British military presence.
With regards to Belize's relationship with the United
Kingdom, Prime Minister Esquivel has made it clear that he
wants to strengthen the commitment of the British to main-
tain their forces in Belize. He has stated:
Paradoxical though it may seem, the independent Belize
welcomes the presence of British troops on our soil.
Indeed, we seek to strengthen a British commitment for
them to remain in Belize.
To this end, he sent Foreign Minister Barrow to London;
however, the British were unwilling to commit themselves to
anything more specific than the "appropriate period" of
involvement that presently defines their commitment. 18
Overall, Belize faces an optimistic future. Although
the economy does suffer from malaise and it does need des-
perate help, the potential for recovery exist. Although the
Guatemalan territorial claim and military threat persist,
Belize has used it to its advantage. The threat continues
to provide Belize with British assistance which benefits
Belize's economy both directly and indirectly. Addi-
tionally, the threat serves as an exploitable issue which
Belize can use to retain international support. The PUP
Government did this successfully through 1984. Whether or
not the UDP continues this practice remains to be seen, but
regardless, no one can deny that during the 1970s and early
1980s, the tiny nation of Belize was indeed a very active
participant in the international community. When Aldous
Huxley derogatorily referred to British Honduras as one of
the ends of the world, little did he know that the new
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